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ORIGINALISM AND THE ARISTOTELIAN
TRADITION: VIRTUE’S HOME IN ORIGINALISM
Lee J. Strang*
A concept fundamental to philosophy—virtue—is, with a few notable
exceptions, absent from scholarship on constitutional interpretation
generally, and on originalism in particular. Furthermore, common
perceptions of both virtue ethics and originalism have prevented
exploration of how incorporating virtue ethics’ insights may make
originalism a better theory of constitutional interpretation. This Article fills
that void by explaining the many ways in which concepts from virtue ethics
are compatible with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation.
More importantly, I show that originalism is more normatively attractive
and descriptively accurate when it incorporates virtue ethics’ insights.
Originalism must articulate virtue’s role in constitutional interpretation
for a number of reasons. First, incorporating the concept of virtue into
originalism will give it greater explanatory power. For example, adding
the concept of virtue to the mix helps originalism embrace ideals such as
judicial craftsmanship.
Second, incorporating the concept of virtue into originalism makes
originalism more normatively attractive. Over the past thirty years,
originalism has come to acknowledge judicial discretion in constitutional
adjudication. An originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics
is able to preserve originalism as a viable theory of constitutional
interpretation while, at the same time, continuing to acknowledge judicial
discretion. An originalism that incorporates virtue ethics’ insights gives the
Constitution’s original meaning its due. Simultaneously, it also gives other
factors—such as the practical workability of legal doctrine—their due, all
in their proper proportion.
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College of Law workshop for their comments and suggestions. In particular, I wish to thank
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their suggestions. I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the research support for this
Article provided by the University of Toledo College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
A concept fundamental to philosophy—virtue1—is, with a few notable
exceptions, absent from scholarship on constitutional interpretation
generally, and originalism in particular. On the one hand, this is surprising
because virtue is central to the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, one of
1. Saint Thomas Aquinas’s famous definition of virtue is “a habit by which we work
well.” ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I–II, Q. 56, art. 3 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947); see also ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON
VIRTUE ETHICS 13 (1999) (“[V]irtue is . . . something that makes its possessor good; a
virtuous person is a morally good, excellent, or admirable person who acts and reacts well,
rightly, as she should—she gets things right.”). I describe the concept of virtue, and related
concepts, below.
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the major philosophical traditions.2 On the other hand, however, this is not
surprising given the sociological makeup of the legal academy.3 The legal
academy—again, with notable exceptions4—is dominated by scholars at
home in the consequentialist and deontological traditions.5 Originalist
scholarship is no exception.
For instance, originalists’ normative arguments for originalism come
from the deontological and consequentialists traditions. Professor Randy
Barnett is representative of the former.
Barnett claims that his
“libertarian”6 originalism is the most normatively attractive form of
originalism because it leads to the greatest protection for natural rights.7
Others, such as Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, have
defended originalism based on the good consequences its adoption would
produce.8 To date, no originalists have articulated what role, if any, virtue
ethics’ concepts should play in a fully developed originalism.9
2. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY 5 (1993) (describing the Aristotelian tradition as the “central tradition of Western
thought about morality and politics”); JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:
PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 7–31 (2006) (describing the origins and
content of the respective philosophical traditions).
3. See Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of
Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 3–7 (Farrelly & Solum eds., 2008) (noting the paucity of
virtue ethics in legal scholarship); see also John O. McGinnis, Matthew A. Schwartz &
Benjamin Tisdell, The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law
School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1195 (2005) (arguing that the American legal academy is
“liberal” as that term is understood in modern political discourse); Lee J. Strang, Originalism
as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities and Practical Differences, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 254 (2011) (describing the legal academy’s legal and political
commitments). For a critical response, see Michael Vitiello, Liberal Bias in the Legal
Academy: Overstated and Undervalued, 77 MISS. L.J. 507 (2007). My assumption in
making this claim is that persons at home in modern American liberalism are less likely to
follow the Aristotelian tradition.
4. The most important exception is Professor Lawrence Solum. See, e.g., Farrelly &
Solum, supra note 3, at 3–7 (introducing the sole book-length treatment of law and virtue
ethics).
5. This is exemplified by the fact that legal scholars routinely utilize concepts
associated with the consequentialist and deontological traditions, but rarely utilize concepts
from the Aristotelian tradition. See id. at 3–7 (describing the move toward virtue ethics in
philosophy and proposing a similar move in law).
6. For critiques of Professor Barnett’s libertarian originalism, see Steven G. Calabresi,
The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy
Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Rights Done Right: A
Critique of Libertarian Originalism, 78 UMKC L. REV. 661 (2010).
7. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 108–09 (2004). See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY:
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998) (detailing the contours and justifications for Barnett’s
conception of natural rights).
8. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution,
98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1695 (2010) (arguing that originalism is justified because it protects the
good consequences that arise from the Constitution’s supermajority requirements); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV.
703, 802–05 (2002) (same).
9. Professor Lawrence Solum has written extensively on how virtue ethics, applied to
law and legal institutions generally—such as judging—is descriptively accurate and
normatively attractive. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 491–520 (2005); Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J.
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Furthermore, common perceptions of both virtue ethics and originalism
have prevented exploration of how incorporating virtue ethics’ insights may
make originalism a better theory of constitutional interpretation. The first
common perception is that virtue ethics—unlike, for example,
deontological ethics—generally does not utilize normative rules and instead
focuses on more amorphous concepts, such as character.10 The second
common perception is that originalism operates primarily through legal
rules derived from the Constitution’s original meaning.11 An ethical theory
that rejects normative rules cannot offer much to a legal theory that deals
primarily in legal rules.
This Article fills that void by explaining the many ways in which
concepts from virtue ethics are, contrary to popular perception, compatible
with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation.
More
importantly, I show that originalism is more normatively attractive and
descriptively accurate when it takes on board virtue ethics’ insights.
Originalism must articulate virtue’s role in constitutional interpretation
for a number of reasons. First, incorporating the concept of virtue into
originalism will give it greater explanatory power. For example, adding the
concept of virtue to the mix helps originalism embrace ideals such as
judicial craftsmanship.12 Originalism can, for instance, strive for the judge
who is excellent at his craft.
Second, incorporating the concept of virtue into originalism makes
originalism more normatively attractive. Originalism has transformed over
the past thirty years in response to legal-realist-type criticisms. Most
importantly, originalism has come to acknowledge judicial discretion in
constitutional adjudication.13 An originalism that incorporates the lessons
of virtue ethics, however, is able to simultaneously preserve originalism as
a viable theory of constitutional interpretation while, at the same time,
continuing to acknowledge judicial discretion. Virtue ethics enables
JURIS. 65, 76–92 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003). Solum has also briefly noted how
virtue ethics may impact “constitutional formalism.” See Solum, The Aretaic Turn in
Constitutional Theory, supra, at 520–22.
10. See, e.g., HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 35–42 (identifying and responding to this
view).
11. The primary source of this view appears to be Justice Antonin Scalia, who, in his
scholarly writings, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175 (1989), and his judicial opinions, see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 127 n.6 (1989), has argued that implementing originalism would lead to a
“ruleification” of constitutional law. I explain below that Justice Scalia’s claims on this
issue are outliers.
12. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793
(2003) (providing a comprehensive account of judicial character that includes the capacity
for judicial craftsmanship); see also Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional
Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969, 972–74 (2011) (focusing more on judicial
craftsmanship). For the classic explanation of judicial craftsmanship, see KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 3–4, 214, 224–25 (1960).
13. Originalism’s acknowledgment of judicial discretion comes primarily in its embrace
of constitutional construction and the preservation of some nonoriginalist precedent. See
infra Part I.B.2.

2012]

ORIGINALISM AND THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION

2001

originalist judges to effectively interpret and put into practice the
Constitution’s original meaning despite and, in part, because of this judicial
discretion. I touched on aspects of a theory of judicial virtue in my
previous writings14 and, in this Article, I more fully articulate an originalist
theory of judicial virtue.
Similarly, incorporating virtue ethics will make originalism better in
those contexts where, even though the original meaning provides a
determinate answer, a case places significant burdens on the judge’s
judgment. In this class of cases—neither the easy cases15 nor those that are
underdeterminate16—virtue ethics provides the means to explain how
judges can best decide.
An originalism that incorporates virtue ethics’ insights will give the
Constitution’s original meaning its due. At the same time, it also gives
other factors—such as the practical workability of legal doctrine—their due,
all in their proper proportion. For originalists, and for nonoriginalists who
value the Constitution’s original meaning,17 this preserves originalism’s
core insights, while enabling originalism’s transformation.
This Article begins by describing originalism and, in particular, the
transformation originalism experienced over the past thirty years.
Originalism’s modern incarnation began in the 1970s and, at that point in its
development, originalists primarily argued that originalism was superior to
nonoriginalist methodologies because originalism cabined judicial
discretion and therefore better respected democracy. Nonoriginalists
strongly criticized this claim and, in response, originalists transformed
originalism in a number of ways that had, as one effect, the creation of
analytical space for judicial discretion within originalism. At this point,
however, originalists have yet to explain how acknowledging this judicial
discretion has not undermined originalism as a theory of interpretation.
Indeed, a recent spate of criticism has utilized this line of attack.18
Part I also shows the impasse that currently exists regarding the
normative foundation for originalism. Originalists have offered a stunning
variety of normative defenses of originalism. However, none has its roots
in the Aristotelian tradition. This situation parallels that of ethics when

14. Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist
Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 484–86 (2006).
15. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
16. Underdeterminacy is when the pertinent legal materials narrow the range of possible
legal answers but do not determine one, uniquely correct answer. See Lawrence B. Solum,
On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473
(1987).
17. See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1187
(distinguishing between “exclusive originalism” and other modes of constitutional
interpretation that utilize history).
18. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713
(2011); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009);
Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707
(2011).
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Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous Modern Moral Philosophy appeared,19
precipitating the move toward recovering virtue ethics.
In Part II, I first describe virtue ethics, and I also explain the relationship
between virtue ethics and the broader Aristotelian philosophical tradition,
including the concepts of human flourishing and natural law. Then, I
recount virtue ethics’ recent revival. Lastly, I describe the limited impact
virtue ethics has had on legal scholarship generally, and constitutional
interpretation in particular.
In Part III, I turn to the heart of the Article: virtue ethics’ contributions
to originalism. I show that originalism can incorporate virtue ethics’
insights even though the two appear incompatible at first blush. Then, I
argue that originalism should incorporate virtue ethics’ insights, and for two
reasons: first, doing so will make originalism more descriptively accurate;
and second, originalism will be more normatively attractive once it
incorporates virtue ethics’ concepts. In particular, I detail four contexts
where originalism becomes better: (1) nonoriginalist precedent; (2)
constitutional construction; (3) articulating and applying the original
meaning; and (4) originalist precedent.
This Article has two goals: one more immediate and one long-term. The
immediate goal of this Article is to respond to recent criticism of
originalism. For example, Professors Thomas Colby and Peter Smith have
argued in a series of papers that originalism is fatally compromised by its
admission of judicial discretion.20 As Professor Colby explained, “Judicial
constraint was [originalism’s] heart and soul—its raison d’etre,” which
originalists have sacrificed by transforming it.21 I argue below that, by
utilizing the conceptual tools provided by virtue ethics, this transformed
originalism is able to retain its core insights—retaining what makes
originalism valuable in the first place—while still accommodating judicial
discretion.
My second goal in writing this Article is to further my long-term
scholarly project of applying the insights of the Aristotelian philosophical
tradition to the United States Constitution.22 Virtue ethics is a key part of
that tradition. Therefore, this Article explores how virtue ethics contributes
to an originalist understanding of constitutional interpretation. By showing
that virtue ethics fits well with originalism, this Article builds one more
bridge between the Aristotelian tradition and originalism.

19. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958).
20. See Colby, supra note 18, at 714; Colby & Smith, supra note 18, at 288–92; Smith,
supra note 18, at 709.
21. Colby, supra note 18, at 714–15.
22. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical
Traditions Within Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central
Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909 (2005) (the first major
piece of this project).
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I. ORIGINALISM’S RISE AND TRANSFORMATION
A. Originalism’s First Generation
Originalism began as a scholarly movement in the 1970s, the aim of
which was to criticize the Warren Court’s perceived excesses.23 Since it
was a critical stance, originalism’s characteristics met that need. In
particular, originalists claimed that originalism was superior to
nonoriginalist methodologies because it cabined judicial discretion.24 Only
by tying judges’ constitutional interpretations to the meaning intended by
the Framers and Ratifiers, argued then-Justice Rehnquist in 1976, would
judges remain in their proper—limited—role.25
The first major originalists scholars were Robert Bork and Raoul
Berger.26 Both lauded originalism for its ability to constrain judges. In his
seminal piece, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
Bork—consciously acting in the Warren Court’s shadow27—argued that the
Supreme Court’s task was to preserve the “Madisonian” compromise
embodied in the Constitution.28 When the Supreme Court performed this
function, it acted legitimately and, when it failed to do so, “the Court
violate[d] the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone justifie[d] its
power.”29
Bork argued that the Constitution’s originally intended meaning was the
sole proper source of Supreme Court authority. An originalist Supreme
Court that followed this meaning, Bork argued, “need make no fundamental
value choices.”30 Instead, the Constitution’s originally intended meaning
would restrain the Court: “The judge must stick close to the text and the
history, and their fair implications.”31
Raoul Berger’s 1977 Government by Judiciary raised the stakes by
arguing that much of the Warren and Burger Courts’ constitutional edifice

23. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 307–09 (2d ed. 1997) (describing his book as a challenge to “the
‘revolutionary’ changes wrought by the Warren Court”); JONATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM
IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 66–67, 92–110 (2005)
(describing originalism in this way); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (stating that “the Warren Court posed the
issue [of the Supreme Court’s proper role] in acute form”); Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601–03 (2004) (concluding that “originalism
was a reactive theory motivated by substantial disagreement with . . . the Warren and Burger
Courts”).
24. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 204 (1980) (noting that one of the arguments made in favor of originalism is that
it “constrains the discretion of decisionmakers”).
25. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
696–97 (1976).
26. Then-Justice Rehnquist also wrote an early and much cited originalist article. Id.
27. Bork, supra note 23, at 1–2.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 8.
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was illegitimate.32 Berger contended that Supreme Court judicial review
was legitimate only when limited to enforcing the Constitution.33
Effectuating this limited form of judicial review required the Supreme
Court to follow the Constitution’s original intent.34 The Warren Court,
whose case law greatly deviated from the Fourteenth Amendment’s original
intent,35 exceeded its proper constitutional role and therefore was
undemocratic36: “The Constitution represents fundamental choices that
have been made by the people, and the task of the Courts is to effectuate
them, ‘not [to] construct new rights.’”37
Originalism’s advocates claimed that originalism would cabin judicial
discretion by advancing legal norms of relatively concrete breadth. This
resulted from the focus, described further below, on the constitutional
provisions’ framers’ concrete intentions.38 Bork’s 1971 discussion of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, for instance, focused on whether the
“history . . . reveal[ed] detailed choices” by the Framers.39
The normative attractiveness of originalism’s ability to cabin judicial
discretion was tied to a second, related claim: judges limited by originalism
respected democracy.40 In originalism’s infancy, its critical stance meant
that it focused on the Warren and Burger Courts’ most controversial cases,
which involved the Court striking down state and federal laws that
purportedly infringed on individual rights.41 Griswold v. Connecticut,42
and Roe v. Wade,43 were the most prominent examples of this because of
the Court’s use of unenumerated rights,44 though the Court’s expansive
32. BERGER, supra note 23.
33. See id. at 4.
34. See id.; see also id. at 402 (defining original intent as “the meaning attached by the
Framers to the words they employed in the Constitution”).
35. See id. at 3 (“The Fourteenth Amendment is the case study par excellence of . . . the
Supreme Court’s ‘exercise of the amending power,’ its continuing revision of the
Constitution under the guise of interpretation.”); id. at 458 (“The Court . . . has flouted the
will of the framers and substituted an interpretation in flat contradiction of the original
design.”).
36. See id. at 308 (stating that, if the Warren Court’s cases had been “authorized by the
Constitution,” it would not have been subject to the charge of being “antidemocratic”); id. at
460 (arguing that courts failing to respect their constitutional limits violate the “essence of a
democratic society”); see also id. at 22–23 (arguing that “the Justices’ substitution of their
own meaning for that of the Founders displaces the choices made by the people . . . and it
violates the basic principle of government by consent of the governed”).
37. Id. at 314.
38. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 603.
39. Bork, supra note 23, at 13; see also BERGER, supra note 23, at 17–18 (describing the
original intent of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in concrete terms); id. at 409–10
(describing the Equal Protection Clause in rule-like terms).
40. See Rehnquist, supra note 25, at 696–97.
41. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 601–03 (providing a typically excellent review of
the characteristics of early originalism).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Bork, supra note 23, at 7 (describing Griswold v.
Connecticut as “in many ways a typical decision of the Warren Court”); see also BERGER,
supra note 23, at 286–87 (using Griswold as an example of unconstrained judging).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Whittington, supra note 23, at 603.
44. See Bork, supra note 23, at 11 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s substantive due
process and “substantive equal protection” case law).
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interpretations of more textually rooted criminal procedure rights, such as in
Miranda v. Arizona,45 received significant criticism as well.46 Originalists
contended that the Supreme Court acted undemocratically and hence
illegitimately when it overturned acts of the elected branches without a
clear warrant in the Constitution’s text or history.47 According to Bork,
“Courts must accept any value choice the legislature makes unless it clearly
runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the Constitution.”48
A third characteristic of this early conception of originalism was its focus
on original intent.49 The original intent of a constitutional provision was
the meaning that the provision’s framers intended it to mean.50 This facet
of originalism was likely unconsciously adopted. It does not appear that
early originalists explored the reasons for and implications of adopting an
intentionalist focus.51 For instance, in an early discussion of Brown v.
Board of Education,52 Bork referred to the “framers’ intent” and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s “legislative history” without explaining why that
was the authoritative source of constitutional meaning.53 The tentativeness
of this early commitment to intentionalism is shown by the quick move to
original meaning originalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, described
below.
Busied with defending originalism in a hostile legal academy, originalists
focused their attention on the basics: a normative justification for
originalism, and how originalism was legitimate in a way the Warren and
Burger Courts’ approach was not. Originalists did not initially address
subtler issues, such as originalism’s response to nonoriginalist precedent.
Those discussions began in earnest following nonoriginalist criticism.54

45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. Raoul Berger’s challenges to the Warren and Burger Courts ranged across doctrinal
categories including voting rights and reapportionment, segregation, Section 5, equal
protection doctrine, the incorporation doctrine, and a host of clauses in the Bill of Rights. See
generally BERGER, supra note 23.
47. See Bork, supra note 23, at 6 (“[A] Court that makes rather than implements value
choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a democratic society.”).
48. Id. at 10–11.
49. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 402; Whittington, supra note 23, at 603.
50. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 402.
51. My tentative hypothesis is that originalists adopted an intentionalist stance for two
related reasons: (1) American legal practice has and continues to be largely intentionalist;
and (2) intentionalism is the best means of ascertaining law’s meaning (at least for enacted
texts).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. See Bork, supra note 23, at 13–14.
54. A second impetus for greater originalist attention to originalism’s subtler
implications was the Rehnquist Court, which did not pose as good a target for criticism and
instead needed a more-fully fleshed-out theory to support at least some aspects of its
jurisprudence. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 603–04.
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B. Originalism’s Transformation in Response
to Legal-Realist-Type Critiques
1. Nonoriginalist Criticisms
Nonoriginalists raised a host of criticisms.55 The most powerful, given
originalism’s critical stance regarding perceived Warren Court activism,
was that originalism did not limit judicial discretion. Nonoriginalists
utilized a variety of arguments to support this criticism; I will focus on four.
First, nonoriginalists argued that it was either impossible in principle to
ascertain the original intent of a multi-member body, such as the
Philadelphia Convention or state ratification conventions;56 or, if possible,
it was practically difficult such that the endeavor would regularly fail.57
Ronald Dworkin, for instance, echoed others when he claimed that “there is
no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even
in principle.”58
Second, nonoriginalists argued that, even when one could reliably
ascertain the Constitution’s original intent, it frequently “ran out.”59 This
occurs, nonoriginalists argued, when societal circumstances have changed
to such a degree that the original intent’s application is underdeterminate.60
The original intent also “ran out” when, due to its high level of generality, it
did not determine the outcome of concrete cases.61 These sources of
underdeterminacy left judges adrift and their decisions unmoored from the
Constitution, thus fatally undermining originalism.
Nonoriginalists further claimed that originalism was fatally flawed
because of its commitment to overrule all or almost all nonoriginalist
precedent. This was a flaw because it showed that originalism was deeply

55. See Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism?: The Evolution of Contemporary
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 12, 17–19 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (detailing two
influential sources of criticism); Whittington, supra note 23, at 605–07 (describing
nonoriginalist criticisms).
56. See Brest, supra note 24, at 214–15, 221–22.
57. See id. at 214, 220.
58. Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 477 (1981).
Dworkin argued that, instead, there are different, plausible, and competing conceptions of
constitutional intention, and a judge’s choice of which conception to follow is founded on
substantive political morality, not a neutral fact of the world, as originalists appeared to
assume. See id. at 477–82.
59. See Brest, supra note 24, at 222 (arguing that the “interpreter’s understanding of the
original understanding may be so indeterminate as to undermine the rationale for
originalism”).
60. See id. at 220 (describing the challenge to originalism posed by the requirement to
“translate the adopters’ intentions into the present”).
61. See id. at 216–17 (arguing that, regarding some texts, the Framers intended to
delegate interpretative discretion to future interpreters to apply general “concept[s]”).
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inconsistent with existing legal practice.62
Originalism’s dramatic
inconsistency raised the specter of legal instability.63
Fourth, nonoriginalists charged that originalism was unacceptable
because of the bad consequences to which its adoption would lead.64
Nonoriginalists questioned whether even the most committed originalist
would push originalism so far. As Professor Paul Brest commented,
originalism “would produce results that even a strict intentionalist would
likely reject.”65
2. Originalism’s Transformation: The Second Generation
In response to these criticisms, originalists reformulated originalism.66
For purposes of this Article, the most fundamental way in which
originalism changed in response to nonoriginalist criticism was that most
originalists acknowledged that judges have discretion in some situations.67
Professor Keith Whittington summarized this transformation: “By the
1990s, originalists . . . were no longer working so clearly in the shadow of
the Legal Realists and the fear of judicial freedom.”68 Relatedly, as
originalists explored the process of originalist interpretation and
adjudication, they emphasized the crucial role that judges—and especially
their capacities such as judgment—play in legal practice.
The originalist concession of judicial interpretative discretion was the
result of three moves made by (most) originalists. First, originalists moved
away from original intent by adopting an original meaning focus for
originalism.69 Original meaning is the conventional meaning of the
Constitution’s text at the time of adoption.70 Although the subjective

62. See id. at 223 (“Strict originalism cannot accommodate most modern decisions under
the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, or the virtually plenary scope of
congressional power under the commerce clause.”).
63. See id. at 231 (arguing that “strict intentionalism produces a highly unstable
constitutional order” because the “settled constitutional understanding,” embodied in
precedent, “is in perpetual jeopardy” of being altered by changes in historical scholarship).
64. See id. at 221, 229 n.96, 230; see also Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 357 (1985) (arguing that the Constitution’s meaning
is more normatively attractive if it is “fill[ed] . . . by our notions of meaning . . . [and] by our
notions of morals”).
65. Brest, supra note 24, at 221.
66. For an early and powerful response, from an original intent perspective, see Richard
S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
67. See Paul Horwitz, Judicial Character (and Does It Matter), 26 CONST. COMMENT.
97, 145 (2009) (book review) (“[N]o purportedly comprehensive theory of
constitutional . . . interpretation can so perfectly constrain the judge as to render the gravity
of the moral choices entailed in judging inconsequential.”).
68. Whittington, supra note 23, at 609.
69. See id. at 609 (“[T]he new originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of
the individual drafters of constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was
adopted.”).
70. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY,
supra note 7, at 89 (defining the original meaning as “the meaning [the Constitution’s
words] had at the time they were enacted”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
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intentions of the Constitution’s Framers and Ratifiers are evidence of the
Constitution’s original meaning, they are not the focus of original meaning
inquiry.71
Original meaning originalism, with its more limited interpretative
resources, results in relatively more cases where the Constitution’s meaning
“runs out.” Original meaning originalism opens up the likelihood of
underdeterminacy72 because it limits the data73 upon which interpretation
relies.74 Original meaning originalism relies on language conventions.
Conventions of language usage are positive human artifacts often without
hard edges and frequently lacking in richness.75 Using the classic “no
vehicles in the park” example,76 the language convention for “vehicles”
lacks both hard edges (it alone cannot determine whether a motorized
scooter counts as a “vehicle”) and depth (it alone might preclude an
ambulance on a life-saving mission).77
By contrast, original intent originalism’s “data set” is richer.78 In
addition to language conventions, an interpreter has access to information
that can provide both more definition to a language convention’s
boundaries and a greater thickness within those boundaries. Most
important, original intent originalism included within its interpretative data
the framers’ originally expected applications, and their purposes or goals.79
Returning to the “no vehicles in the park” hypothetical, a judge
interpreting the term “vehicles” would know, from the ordinance’s
legislative history, that the city council that passed the ordinance debated
whether the ordinance would apply to scooters, and concluded that it did
not. This information would harden “vehicles” scope to exclude scooters.
Similarly, a judge would have access to the fact that the city council’s
purpose in passing the ordinance was to prevent teenagers from driving
their cars on the park grounds and terrorizing park patrons. This fact would
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (1999)
(same) (citation omitted).
71. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 609–10.
72. See Solum, supra note 16, at 473 (defining underdeterminacy).
73. By “data,” I mean the pertinent evidence utilized by the respective originalist camps
to articulate the Constitution’s meaning.
74. This claim assumes that interpreters cannot draw upon the interpretative conventions
in place when the Constitution’s text received authority. See John O. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case
Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009) (articulating and advocating use
of these conventions).
75. Cf. PLATO, STATESMAN 294b–c (Robin Waterfield trans., 1995) (“[Law] is like a
stubborn, stupid person who refuses to allow the slightest deviation from or questioning of
his own rules, even if the situation has in fact changed and it turns out to be better for
someone to contravene these rules.”).
76. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125–26 (1961) (using this example).
77. See Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 51–52 (2005) (making a similar argument).
78. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 720 (2009) (arguing that there are more
interpretative “sources” and “information” available to original intent originalists).
79. See Solum, supra note 55, at 24–27.
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add thickness to the meaning of “vehicles” and exclude ambulances on lifesaving missions from its purview. My claim here—that original meaning
originalism results in greater underdeterminacy—is bolstered by original
meaning originalists’ quick and explicit embrace of the concepts of
vagueness and ambiguity to describe the sources of this
underdeterminacy.80
In practice, and for many situations, original meaning and original intent
originalism will arrive at the same conclusion.81 However, there are
constitutional terms and phrases for which original intent originalism will
provide more evidence from which to draw. Prominent original intent
originalist, Professor Richard Kay, has likewise concluded that “public
meaning originalism will generate more cases of constitutional
indeterminacy than will the originalism of original intentions.”82
Relatedly, the shift to original meaning originalism away from original
intent foreclosed access to closure rules. This, in turn, increased the
likelihood and frequency of underdeterminacy. Closure rules apply when
an interpreter has reached a point when the interpretive data does not
provide a right answer.83 In those situations, the closure rule will instruct
the interpreter to choose one of the plausible (but not uniquely correct)
candidate interpretations.84
For example, one of the interpretative rules explicitly embraced by the
Constitution’s Ninth and Tenth Amendments is that Congress’s powers
should be narrowly interpreted.85 This means that, if there are two
plausible competing interpretations of, for instance, Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority, the Supreme Court should utilize the more narrow
interpretation. The Supreme Court utilized this rule of construction in its
recent anti-commandeering cases,86 New York v. United States87 and Printz
v. United States.88
80. See Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional
Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 631–37 (2009).
81. See Solum, supra note 55, at 27.
82. Kay, supra note 78, at 721.
83. The point at which a closure rule applies could vary, and scholars have not settled on
one standard. One possible position is that a closure rule applies when two plausible
interpretations are in equipoise. Another plausible position is that the rule applies only when
there is not a clearly correct interpretation. Undoubtedly, there are others as well. See
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 74, at 774–75 (describing some possible closure rules in
relation to vagueness).
84. Closure rules can possess varying degrees of weight. A closure rule can dictate an
outcome, or it could have less weight and suggest an outcome.
85. See Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment,
Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889,
1954 (2008) (concluding that the Tenth Amendment articulates a rule of limited construction
of federal power).
86. See id. at 1896 (“[A]n originalist reading of the Tenth Amendment which tracks
Madison’s reading of the clause would place the contemporary Court’s federalism
jurisprudence on firmer ground, both in terms of the Constitution’s text and historical
understanding.”).
87. 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
88. 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).
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Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s approach, labeled
original methods originalism, explicitly embraces closure rules.89 They
argue that, to uncover the Constitution’s meaning,90 originalists must utilize
the interpretative rules in place when the Constitution’s text was ratified.91
Original methods originalism’s embrace of closure rules is best exemplified
by Professors McGinnis and Rappaport’s contention that originalism limits
or eliminates the need to resort to constitutional construction.92 Instead of
resorting to construction when the Constitution’s meaning is vague or
ambiguous, they propose that the original interpretative methods prevent
underdeterminacy.93
Of course, there remain many originalists who have continued to
advocate for original intent originalism. Most of these originalists too,
following the early nonoriginalist criticism described above, have conceded
that the Constitution’s originally intended meaning “runs out.”94
The second move made by originalists,95 as a result of originalism’s
concession of judicial discretion, is their embrace of the concept of
constitutional construction.96 Constitutional construction is the idea that, in
at least some cases, the Constitution’s original meaning does not determine
a case’s outcome.97 The original meaning may limit the range of possible
outcomes, but judges are left with discretion.98 Although originalists differ
on which government officials have authority to construct constitutional
89. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 74, at 752.
90. This applies to both the original meaning and original intent versions of originalism.
See id. at 751.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 752.
93. See id. While original intent originalism is open to closure rules in a way that
original meaning originalism is not, few original intent originalists have argued as
aggressively as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport that closure rules eliminate all or nearly
all underdeterminacy. The notable exception is Richard Kay, who invoked the closure rule
that “there will be a better answer to every litigated question of constitutional interpretation.”
Kay, supra note 78, at 721 n.75.
94. See Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139, 142–43 (2010)
(stating that “originalists should concede” that there is “some range of indeterminacy or
uncertainty”).
One may ask why, if the move to original meaning caused an increase in
originalism’s underdeterminacy, originalists made this move. The shift was prompted by
nonoriginalist criticism that the original intent did not exist and/or was not practically
accessible. Original meaning originalism either defeats or blunts these criticisms. However,
it also opens originalism to the charge that it leaves the original meaning underdetermined.
In sum, original meaning originalism preserves a determinate core of constitutional meaning
while conceding an area of underdeterminacy.
95. As noted earlier, McGinnis and Rappaport argue that utilization of interpretative
closure rules eliminates all (or almost all) underdeterminacy. See McGinnis & Rappaport,
supra note 74, at 752.
96. All of the most prominent original meaning originalists have incorporated
construction into their understandings of originalism. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 118–30; WHITTINGTON,
supra note 70, at 7–14; Solum, supra note 55, at 24; see also Jack M. Balkin, Framework
Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 566–75 (2009) (describing
the important role played by construction in Balkin’s version of originalism).
97. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 7.
98. See Solum, supra note 55, at 34.
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meaning when the Constitution’s original meaning is underdeterminate,99
all originalists agree that construction involves the exercise of relatively100
unbounded choice.101
The third manifestation of originalism’s acknowledgment of discretion is
its retention of some nonoriginalist precedent. Originalists have argued that
originalism preserves a place for some nonoriginalist precedent.102 This
intermediate position—between “get rid of it all” and “keep it all”103—
required originalists to draw a line between those nonoriginalist precedents
a judge should overrule, and those he should retain. For example, I argued
elsewhere that a judge should utilize three factors to determine whether to
overrule a nonoriginalist precedent.104 Applying these factors will
99. Compare WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 7, 9, 11 (arguing that construction is a
political and hence non-judicial enterprise), with BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 122 (“I do not share
Whittington’s characterization of the process of construction as ‘political.’”). But see Keith
E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 125–
29 (2010) (modifying his previous position and concluding that, “[s]o long as judges are
acting as faithful agents to provisionally maintain constitutional understandings widely
shared by other political actors, then their role in articulating constitutional constructions
may not be objectionable”).
100. That is, relative to the activity of constitutional interpretation.
101. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY,
supra note 7, at 122; WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 7.
Professor Solum has recently provided a more thorough articulation of his
conception of constitutional construction. See Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). There, Professor Solum argues
that constitutional interpretation is the articulation of the Constitution’s linguistic meaning,
and construction is giving legal effect to constitutional text. See id. at 95–96. Professor
Solum’s understanding of construction appears to differ from my description because, in
Professor Solum’s view, construction occurs even when the Constitution’s original meaning
determines the outcome of a case. See id. at 107–08 (describing how construction operates
both when “the legal content of constitutional doctrine is equivalent to the semantic content
of the text,” and when “the sematic content of the text constrains but does not fully specify
the legal content of constitutional doctrine”). Professor Solum’s conception of construction,
even if different, fits my core point: most originalists today agree that constitutional
construction exists and, at least in a significant percentage of cases in the “construction
zone,” “involve[] judgment or choice.” Id. at 108.
102. There is a fairly even split among originalists on whether, and to what extent,
originalism preserves at least some nonoriginalist precedent. Originalists scholarship that
argues in favor of preservation includes Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and
Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1441–42 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 803–04
(2009); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis,
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 155–
59 (2006); and Strang, supra note 14, at 419–20.
103. I am not aware of any originalists who have advocated keeping all nonoriginalist
precedent. There are many scholars who argue for a position similar to this, but they are not
originalists. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509,
511 (1996) (describing the role that precedent would play in a Burkean approach to
constitutional interpretation).
104. The three factors are: (1) how far does the nonoriginalist precedent deviate from the
Constitution’s original meaning?; (2) how much, if at all, would overruling the precedent
harm Rule of Law values?; and (3) does the precedent instantiate fairness? Strang, supra
note 14, at 472. I describe my approach to nonoriginalist precedent, and these three factors,
in greater detail in Part III.C.3.b, infra.
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frequently be challenging, and judges will frequently have discretion in
doing so, especially if the factors point in different directions and possess
different weights.105
Take, for example, Katzenbach v. McClung,106 which involved the
question of the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. The
Supreme Court relied on the substantial effects test, most prominently
described in the nonoriginalist precedent Wickard v. Filburn,107 to uphold
Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.108 This, in turn, makes McClung a
nonoriginalist precedent.109
If a case arose today in which McClung was challenged, an originalist
judge would have to utilize three factors (that I articulated in previous
scholarship). Very briefly, the judge would likely conclude: (1) that
McClung was a significant deviation from the Commerce Clause’s original
meaning; (2) overruling McClung would have some adverse impact on Rule
of Law values; and (3) McClung did create fair relationships on the
important axis of race. These factors point in different directions and they
point in their respective directions with varying degrees of weight. The
hypothetical judge would have a choice in how to rule.
Even those originalists who argue for the overruling of all or nearly all
nonoriginalist precedent retain a place for judicial discretion. Professor
Randy Barnett, for instance, who has concluded that “the doctrine of
precedent is inconsistent with originalism,” acknowledges space for an
originalist judge to retain nonoriginalist precedent to protect the “claims
made by particular persons made in reliance on mistaken precedent.”110
Judges following Professor Barnett’s prescription will exercise discretion to
determine, among other things, whether the reliance was sufficiently
directed to the mistaken precedent and whether it was sufficiently weighty.
In addition to acknowledging judicial discretion in the three contexts I
identified, originalists also explained that, even in cases where judges do
not have discretion, they must still utilize judgment, along with other
human capacities. This move by originalists took many forms, but two
characteristics in particular are important for my purposes: the process of
articulating and applying the Constitution’s original meaning, and
originalist precedent.
First, originalists have begun to explain in more detail the analytical
process judges utilize.
This process has many features including,
importantly, the articulation of the Constitution’s original meaning and

105. Strang, supra note 14, at 484 (“The originalist theory of precedent I have been
discussing provides that judges will often have broad discretion to determine how to react to
nonoriginalist constitutional precedent.”).
106. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
107. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
108. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 302–04.
109. Assuming that there is not another originalist basis for the decision.
110. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 259, 266 (2005).
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application of that meaning.111 Second, and relatedly, originalists have
argued that originalist precedent plays a central role in originalism.112 Both
characteristics frequently place tremendous burdens on judges’ judgment
and their other faculties.
Today’s transformed originalism has opened a space for judicial
discretion and a place for the exercise of judicial judgment. Originalism
today explicitly acknowledges judicial discretion in the contexts of
constitutional construction and nonoriginalist precedent.
Further,
originalism has also embraced the fact that judges exercise judgment,
constrained though it may be, and other human capacities in the contexts of
originalist precedent and in the paradigmatic work of articulating and
applying the Constitution’s original meaning.
C. Impasse in Normative Justifications for Originalism
Originalists have offered a stunning variety of normative justifications
for originalism.113 However, no one has yet offered a normative foundation
in virtue ethics. Instead, two camps of originalists state claims that are
premised on conflicting philosophical traditions. One group grounds
originalism in the deontological tradition,114 and the other utilizes a
consequentialist foundation.115 While the respective camps have presented
powerful and nuanced statements for their positions, the ultimate
incompatibility of the camps’ respective philosophical commitments has
impeded consensus.
Professor Barnett, for example, acknowledged that his natural rightsbased justification for originalism may not persuade those who either do not
believe that natural rights exist or do not believe they play the significant
role that he attributes to them.116 Barnett, with his characteristic insight,
then argues that his defense of originalism can incorporate such conflicting

111. See Solum, supra note 102, at 96; Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent:
The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1767.
112. See Solum, supra note 102, at 185; Strang, supra note 111, at 1766–88.
113. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY,
supra note 7, at 54–68, 109–13 (arguing that originalism best protects natural rights);
WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 110–59 (grounding originalism in popular sovereignty);
McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 8, at 802–05
(arguing that originalism is justified because it protects the good consequences that arise
from the Constitution’s supermajority requirements); Strang, supra note 22, at 983–97
(arguing that originalism best secures human flourishing). Solum has also argued that one
version of originalism, what he calls “Semantic Originalism,” is compatible with most
normative justifications for originalism. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 128–
34 (Illinois Pub. L. and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, Nov. 22, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
114. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY,
supra note 7, at 54–68.
115. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 8, at
802–05.
116. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY,
supra note 7, at 3–4.
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views because it can maximize ultimate values other than natural rights,
such as good consequences.117
This situation parallels the one in ethics when Elizabeth Anscombe
published her path-breaking piece, Modern Moral Philosophy,118 in
1958.119 There, Anscombe argued that ethics had been locked in an evermore-intricate, though still interminable, debate between consequentialists
and deontologists.120 She suggested that a return to virtue ethics might
redirect the debate and possibly even overcome the impasse.121
This Article takes the first step toward making a similar move in the
context of constitutional interpretation. By explaining how one of the
major theories of constitutional interpretation is improved when informed
by virtue ethics, I set the stage for a later piece that will explicitly ground
originalism in virtue ethics and the related concept of human flourishing.
D. Conclusion
My goal thus far has been to describe originalism’s rise, the criticism to
which it has been subject, and originalism’s transformation in response to
that criticism. The key point of this transformation is that most conceptions
of originalism today acknowledge that judicial discretion is an indelible part
of judging. Relatedly, as originalists explored originalism’s contours, the
transformed originalism has acknowledged the sometimes great burdens on
judges’ judgment and other capacities.
At this point, however, no originalists have explained how these
modifications—judicial discretion and burdens on judges’ capacities—do
not undermine originalism’s core insights. Why does significant discretion
not undermine originalism’s source thesis?122 And, why do the burdens
placed on judges’ judgment and capacities not undercut originalism’s
contribution thesis?123 In Part III, I show that virtue ethics provides
answers to these questions. Virtue ethics has the conceptual “tool kit” to
explain how the transformed originalism maintains its core commitments.

6.

117. See id.
118. Anscombe, supra note 19.
119. A similar claim is made and expanded upon in Farrelly & Solum, supra note 3, at 3–

120. See Anscombe, supra note 19, at 9, 13–14.
121. See id. at 18.
122. For the most thorough discussion of the source and contributions theses in print, see
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
923, 953–54 (2009). See also Solum, supra note 55, at 29–32 (describing the theses); Randy
E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011)
(providing a slightly different statement of originalism’s core propositions).
123. See supra note 122 (discussing the contribution thesis).
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II. THE ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION AND THE RETURN
TO VIRTUE ETHICS
A. The Aristotelian Philosophical Tradition: Background
The Aristotelian philosophical tradition is the central Western
philosophical tradition.124 It has its origin in Greek thought, particularly
Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates.125 In the High Middle Ages,126 after the fall
of the Western Roman Empire,127 St. Thomas Aquinas began the synthesis
of Aristotle’s thought with the Christian philosophical inheritance,
especially from St. Augustine.128 The Aristotelian tradition flourished until
the onset of the Reformation when, due to many factors,129 other
philosophical traditions eclipsed it in many areas of Europe and the West
more generally.130
The alacrity and comprehensiveness of this move away from the
Aristotelian tradition varied. For instance, in Catholic Spain, the tradition
experienced a Silver Age in the sixteenth century, when a number of
scholars turned with renewed interest to apply Aristotelian philosophical
concepts to new circumstances, such as the discovery of American
Indians131 and the rise of capitalism.132 By the late nineteenth century—
outside of subcultures such as Catholic institutions—the Aristotelian
tradition was swept from the field in the West.133

124. See GEORGE, supra note 2, at 5 (describing the Aristotelian tradition in this manner).
125. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 89–90 (1988)
(“It is Plato’s project which Aristotle vindicates and . . . completes . . . .”).
126. See CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE 140–217
(1991) (describing various facets of the High Middle Ages).
127. The key bridge figure between ancient philosophy and Scholasticism was Boethius.
For a brief biography of Boethius, see W. Turner, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, in
THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1907), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
02610b.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
128. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY:
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 120, 123–24 (1990) (describing St. Thomas’s
synthesis).
129. These factors included the Reformers perception that their religious doctrines were
at odds with Aristotle’s philosophical claims. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 165
(2d ed. 1984). The Reformers also perceived in Aristotle a too-close ally of the Catholic
Church. See id. Another factor was the rise of modern science, which explained natural
phenomena without resort to the heretofore central Aristotelian concepts of essential form
and final cause. See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 112–13 (1991). A corresponding philosophical move to eliminate the concepts of
essential form and final end was made by many philosophers in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Id. at 113–21.
130. See MACINTYRE, supra note 125, at 209–13.
131. See, e.g., FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, O.P., DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES
(1532) (J.P. Bate trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1917) (utilizing the Aristotelian tradition’s
concepts to argue for protections of American Indians); see also GORDLEY, supra note 129,
at 69–71 (describing the broader Thomistic revival).
132. See MACINTYRE, supra note 125, at 211.
133. See GORDLEY, supra note 129, at 161 (“[T]he authority of Aristotle collapsed in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”).
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A worldwide natural law revival occurred in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.134 Focus on Aristotle’s and especially St. Thomas
Aquinas’s thought characterized what is commonly labeled the NeoScholastic or Neo-Thomistic revival.135 This revival was, to a large but not
complete degree,136 limited to the Catholic intellectual world. However, it
fragmented in the late 1950s and early 1960s.137
In the past thirty years, a more broad-based natural law revival has
occurred. The commonly cited138 initiation of today’s revival is the
publication of John Finnis’s Natural Law and Natural Rights in 1980.139
Contemporaneous with this natural law revival has been the modern revival
of interest in virtue ethics, which I discuss below.140
B. Relationship Between the Broader Aristotelian Tradition
and Virtue Ethics
The Aristotelian tradition has many facets. It makes robust theoretical
and practical claims.141 In this Article, I focus on one concept at home in
the tradition: virtue.142
Philosophy is traditionally divided into theoretical (also known as
speculative)143 and practical subdisciplines.144 Theoretical philosophy’s
goal is truth about reality,145 such as in metaphysics, which deals with the

134. See MACINTYRE, supra note 128, at 72–77; GERALD A. MCCOOL, S.J., THE NEOTHOMISTS 25–40 (1994).
135. See MCCOOL, supra note 134, at 1–42; GERALD A. MCCOOL, S.J., FROM UNITY TO
PLURALISM: THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION OF THOMISM 29–32 (1989).
136. For instance, Mortimer Adler, a prominent mid-twentieth century philosopher, was a
well-known Thomist. See William Grimes, Mortimer Adler, 98, Dies; Helped Create Study
of Classics, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at B8 (describing Adler as “championing” the ideas
of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas). Another example of the penetration of the NeoScholastic revival was Jacques Maritain’s involvement in drafting the U.N. Declaration on
Human Rights. See generally JULIE KERNAN, OUR FRIEND, JACQUES MARITAIN (1975).
137. See MCCOOL, supra note 135, at 34–35, 224–30.
138. See Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
139. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
140. The revival of interest in virtue ethics is frequently tied to Elizabeth Anscombe’s
1958 piece, Modern Moral Philosophy. See supra note 19. In Catholic circles, the Second
Vatican Council’s call for a renewal of moral theology is frequently cited as the cause for
renewed interest in virtue ethics. See, e.g., ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P., INTRODUCTION TO
MORAL THEOLOGY 129–30, 241–42 (2001) (making this claim).
141. See, e.g., ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–I, Q. 46, art. 1 (arguing, against Aristotle,
that the universe was created by an eternal God); id. at I–II, Q. 94, art. 2 (describing the first
principle of natural law and three primary principles of natural law: self-preservation,
procreation, and practical reasonableness).
142. For St. Thomas’s most wide-ranging discussion of virtue, see his Treatise on Habits,
id. at I–II, QQ. 49–89.
143. See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 38 (1998) (explaining the challenges of translating
St. Thomas’s “speculativa”).
144. See id. at 21 (describing the four orders of science, which include two practical
orders and two non-practical orders).
145. See RALPH MCINERNY, ETHICA THOMISTICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS
AQUINAS 24–25 (1997) (giving this description).
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subject of being.146 Practical philosophy’s goal is guiding human action,
such as in ethics, the subject matter of which includes the licitness of
human actions.147 Virtue ethics falls into the category of practical
philosophy.148
In the Aristotelian philosophical tradition as, for example, in the
deontological tradition, there are significant relationships between
theoretical and practical propositions. One instance of this is the
relationship between the metaphysical understanding of human beings as
having a form (essence, or soul), and the practical proposition that human
acts are good when they conform to the type of being humans are149:
rational animals.150 This Article, by focusing on the practical philosophical
concept of virtue, puts to one side most concepts from theoretical
philosophy, and much of practical philosophy as well.
C. Virtue Ethics, Natural Law, and the Return to Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is one of the three prominent ethical traditions in the
West.151 Its most widespread form is Aristotelian.152 The two other
competing ethical traditions are deontology and consequentialism.153 I first
describe virtue ethics and its relationship to the broader Aristotelian
philosophical tradition, emphasizing what makes virtue ethics distinct from
other ethical traditions.
1. Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is primarily characterized by its focus on the concept of
virtue in the ethical life.154 In answer to what is usually taken as the
fundamental ethical question of “what sorts of action should I do?,”155 a
virtue
theorist
answers,
“what
a
virtuous
agent
would
characteristically . . . do in the circumstances.”156 However, virtue ethics
146. For an accessible modern statement, see W. NORRIS CLARK, S.J., THE ONE AND THE
MANY: A CONTEMPORARY THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS (2001).
147. See MCINERNY, supra note 145, at 23–25.
148. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 55, art.1.
149. See id. at I–II, Q. 50, art. 2 (tying the virtues to the soul).
150. See id. at I–I, Q. 76, art. 1 (stating that man has a rational soul that is united with his
body).
151. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 1–3.
152. See id. at 8 (articulating a “neo-Aristotelian” virtue ethics); MCINERNY, supra note
145, at 12–25 (describing Aristotle’s ethics and how it formed the basis for Thomistic
ethics); ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 55, art. 1 (relying on “[t]he Philosopher” to
define virtue).
I describe below that virtue theorists tend to fall into two distinct but related camps.
One group is composed of Neo-Aristotelians who focus on Aristotle to the not-complete
exclusion of later, religious interpreters of Aristotle, such as St. Thomas Aquinas. The other
group of scholars attempts to utilize Aristotle and his (primarily) Christian followers,
especially St. Thomas Aquinas, and later philosophers, including the Spanish Scholastics.
See infra Part II.C.3.
153. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 1–3.
154. See id. at 1.
155. Id. at 26.
156. Id. at 28.
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pushes back against the question itself. In virtue ethics, the fundamental
issue is not action: it is character.157 Virtue theorists argue that the focus of
ethical inquiry should be the instantiation and exercise of virtue, not an
algorithm of right action.158
Virtue is a habit159—an entrenched disposition of character160—to
perform a human function well. For example, the virtue of fortitude
enables one to ascertain what courage requires in concrete situations and
to—willingly—act accordingly.161 A person who possesses fortitude will
know what courage requires in particular situations, have the intellectual
disposition to act courageously when called to do so, be emotionally
disposed to act courageously, and will reliably act courageously.162 “The
concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor
good; a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent, or admirable person
who acts and reacts well, rightly, as she should—she gets things right.”163
Virtues are conventionally divided into two categories164: intellectual
virtues and moral virtues.165 The intellectual virtues perfect our reasoning
faculties. Those intellectual virtues located in the speculative intellect are
understanding, science, and theoretical wisdom;166 the intellectual virtues in
the practical intellect are practical wisdom or prudence, and art.167 The
moral virtues perfect our appetites and most prominently include justice,
temperance, and fortitude.168
Later, in Part III, I use examples to detail how these various virtues
operate in originalist constitutional interpretation. At this point, however,
let me briefly describe the foundational set of virtues that operate in the
context of judging. Judging, as a general activity—in other words, not
confined to constitutional interpretation—requires a number of virtues for
its successful execution.169 Professor Lawrence Solum identified and

157. See id. at 29.
158. See id. at 2–3.
159. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 56, art. 3 (“[V]irtue is a habit by which we
work well.”).
160. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 10–12.
161. See JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES: PRUDENCE, JUSTICE, FORTITUDE,
TEMPERANCE 115–41 (1965) (describing the virtue of fortitude). Being virtuous, including
being courageous, requires the assistance of practical wisdom. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note
1, at 12.
162. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 10–12 (making a similar claim regarding
honesty).
163. Id. at 13.
164. This distinction was traditionally based on the portion of the soul in which the virtue
operated. Intellectual virtues are facets of the soul’s rational part, see ST. THOMAS, supra
note 1, at I–II, Q. 56, art. 3, while moral virtues are facets of the sensitive portion of the
irrational soul, see id. at I–II, Q. 56, art. 4.
165. See id. at I–II, Q. 56, arts. 3–4.
166. See id. at I–II, Q. 57, art. 2.
167. See MCINERNY, supra note 145, at 96 (giving this description).
168. See id. at 97–98.
169. The virtues correspond to vices. For instance, the virtue of theoretical wisdom
corresponds to the vice of stupidity. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 36 (describing how
virtue theorists may articulate rules of conduct from virtues and their corresponding vices).
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described the primary virtues required for judging,170 and my discussion
parallels his excellent scholarship.
The principal judicial virtues include: theoretical wisdom, practical
wisdom, justice-as-lawfulness, temperance,171 and fortitude. Next, I
describe each of these virtues in more detail.
A judge is excellent only if he has the theoretical wisdom—the
intellectual “firepower,” we might say—to perform the relatively abstract
legal tasks necessary to judging. Judges must possess this capacity in order
to know and understand the law that bears on a given case. In some cases,
especially hard cases,172 this task places tremendous burdens on the judge’s
faculties and, depending on one’s theory of adjudication, judges may have
to utilize theoretical wisdom on a regular basis.173
Theoretical wisdom first enables the judge to master the law’s “data”:
the cases, statutes, regulations, legal principles, and legal practices that are
pertinent to the case before the judge.174 This mastery has two components:
the judge’s pre-existing knowledge of the law in the judge’s jurisdiction,
and the knowledge of the law that the judge gathers in the context of a
particular case.175 Building on this knowledge of the legal data, the judge
must then uncover the relationship between the pertinent legal materials—
which of the legal data structures the other pieces, and how the data is
structured.176 Theoretical wisdom permits the judge to arrive at the
structure of legal norms governing a case.177
For instance, to understand how the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use
Clause governs a particular case, a judge would have to grasp the Clause’s
original meaning, read and understand originalist precedent applying the
Clause, and ascertain any authoritative practices under the Clause.178 Then,
the judge would synthesize this data into a coherent legal structure. Most
frequently, this takes the form of the legal rules, standards, or principles
170. Professor Solum has written on this subject in many fora. See supra note 9 (listing
several works by Professor Solum); see also FARRELLY & SOLUM, supra note 3, at 1–23,
142–92. For a balanced critique of Professor Solum’s virtue jurisprudence thesis, see R.A.
Duff, The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 214 (2003).
171. Professor Solum identified the additional virtue of judicial temperament. See Solum,
Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 9, at 191.
172. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81–130 (1977).
173. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note
9, at 182–83 (making this point regarding Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity).
174. See STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 51–54 (1992) (describing the
reasons that judges incorporate into their analysis).
175. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note
9, at 191–92 (describing how a judge’s pre-existing mastery of law is pertinent to, but not a
manifestation of, theoretical wisdom).
176. See BURTON, supra note 174, at 54–59; Strang, supra note 77, at 66–67.
177. As Professor Solum has pointed out, theoretical wisdom is also important because it
gives judges “the ability to grasp the facts of disputes that may involve particular
disciplines.” Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, supra note 9, at 191.
178. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505–14 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (synthesizing the Public Use Clause’s original meaning from the Clause’s text,
the text and structure of the rest of the Constitution, and early American state practice); see
also County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 779–83 (Mich. 2004) (surveying the
Michigan Constitution’s text and original understanding of that text).
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tailored to the factual context presented by the case.179 At each step,
without significant intellectual capabilities, the judge will perform poorly.
Consequently, judges need theoretical wisdom to perform these tasks well.
Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that enables its possessor to
perform two tasks well: first, identify those goods that are valuable and
therefore worth pursuing; and second, perceive the means most conducive
to pursuing those identified goods.180 Practical wisdom, in the context of
judging, is primarily concerned with the second task.181 Practical wisdom
provides the capacity to articulate legal doctrine that mediates legal
meaning and the facts presented in cases.182
Using the Commerce Clause as an example, once a judge has mastered
the Clause’s operative legal meaning, the judge must still apply that
meaning in a case. In doing so, the judge will articulate legal doctrines that
connect the meaning to the facts. In the Commerce Clause context, the preNew Deal Supreme Court created a series of doctrines, such as the original
packages doctrine183 and the instrumentalities of commerce doctrine,184
among others,185 to do just that. These legal doctrines bridged the
179. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Public Use Clause is most
naturally read to authorize takings for public use only if the government or the public
actually uses the taken property.”); see also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (“[T]he transfer of
condemned property to a private entity, seen through the eyes of an individual sophisticated
in the law at the time of ratification of our 1963 Constitution, would be appropriate in one of
three contexts: (1) where public necessity of the extreme sort requires collective action; (2)
where the property remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a private entity; and
(3) where the property is selected because of facts of independent public significance, rather
than the interests of the private entity to which the property is eventually transferred.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
180. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 57, art. 5; Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A
Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 9, at 192.
181. Practical wisdom in the context of judging is primarily concerned with the second
task because the judge’s ends are, in the focal case of judging, set for the judge by the
pertinent law. As I describe below, however, practical wisdom, in situations when judges
exercise discretion, also plays the first role of identifying goods worth pursuing. This
occurs, for instance, in the contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional
construction discussed in Part III.C.3, infra.
182. See Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 767–71
(1989) (describing how legal doctrine impacts citizens’ practical deliberations); see also
Strang, supra note 14, at 486 (describing the relatively free-ranging role practical wisdom
will play in the context of nonoriginalist precedent).
183. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441–42 (1827) (“It is sufficient
for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted upon the thing
imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the
country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to
the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his
warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too
plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution.”).
184. See Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (articulating the
instrumentalities of commerce doctrine).
185. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905) (“[W]hen this is a
typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce
among the states, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.”);
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 517 (1922) (reaffirming and applying the holding of
Swift).
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analytical space between the Clause’s original meaning and the recurring
factual situations presented by the cases in which the Court articulated those
doctrines.186
Justice-as-lawfulness is the virtue of giving one’s society’s laws their
due.187 Justice-as-lawfulness is, in many ways, the excellence that defines a
good judge qua judge.188 Saint Thomas Aquinas recognized this when he
described the etymology of “judge.”189 Without the virtue of justice, a
judge’s incredible intellect, stout courage, and measured temperament
would only make the judge worse.190
A just judge is one who exercises judgment191 “according to the written
law.”192 The judge who possesses the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has
the “habit . . . [of] render[ing] to each one his due by a constant and
perpetual will.”193 Saint Thomas’s linking of justice-as-lawfulness to a
society’s positive law flows from the essential role positive law plays in
securing a society’s common good.194 In this, St. Thomas followed
Aristotle.195
The virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has the most “bite” when a judge
faces a law that the judge does not think—at least in that instance—
advances the common good.196 For example, in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court denied Joshua
DeShaney’s claim of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause for the county’s failure to protect him from his wicked
father’s abuse.197 The Court acknowledged that it was moved with “natural
sympathy . . . to find a way for Joshua and his mother to receive adequate
compensation for the grievous harm inflicted upon them.”198 The Court’s

186. See Strang, supra note 111, at 1767–78 (describing this phenomenon in the context
of originalist precedent).
187. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1095a (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999);
RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 102–03, 106 (2002).
188. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note
9, at 194 (stating that justice is central to our concept of a good judge).
189. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 60, art. 1.
190. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note
9, at 194 (describing such a judge as “an especially bad judge”).
191. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 60, art. 1.
192. Id. at II–II, Q. 60, art. 5. For St. Thomas, since the written law is fully law only
insofar as it instantiates the natural law, see id. at II–II, Q. 60, art. 5, a judge’s duty to follow
positive law is contingent on its relationship, or lack thereof, to the natural law (with some
qualifications). Cf. Horwitz, supra note 67, at 154–55 (arguing that a virtuous judge is not
necessarily a formalist judge).
193. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 58, art. 1.
194. See id. at I–II, Q. 96, art. 4.
195. See KRAUT, supra note 187, at 102–11 (describing justice-as-lawfulness as the virtue
of giving the community’s laws their due regard because they provide the framework within
which the common good is possible).
196. For example, if the law is not the product of practical wisdom and is instead “special
interest legislation,” it violates distributive justice. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q.
96, art. 4.
197. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
198. Id. at 202–03.
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faithfulness to the Constitution—its refusal to improperly expand the Due
Process Clause’s scope199—exemplified justice-as-lawfulness.200
Temperance and fortitude describe two facets of judicial character that a
judge must possess to rule according to the law.201 A temperate judge will
hold in check his sensual appetites.202 A temperate judge will be resistant
to the allure of, for instance, the “good life” that a bribe could buy.203
Courage is the firmness of mind that enables one to react appropriately to
danger,204 and a courageous judge will rule according to the law even in the
face of potential harm to his reputation, career, or even family and life.205
2. Virtue, Human Flourishing, and the Natural Law
Important to fully understanding the concept of virtue in the Aristotelian
tradition is a related concept: human flourishing.206 Virtue ethics is
teleological because the goal towards which the virtues enable their
possessor to move is human flourishing.207 Virtue is both constitutive of
human flourishing and instrumental to securing it.
Human flourishing is the state of being most fully human which, in the
Aristotelian tradition, means acting rationally excellently.208 Humans are
distinct from other animals by having the capacity to reason.209 As a result,
a human will be most fully human when he exercises his reason—both
theoretical and practical—excellently.210 A person’s excellent utilization of
199. There is an at least plausible argument that a claim such as DeShaney’s should be
viable under the Equal Protection Clause. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9–44 (1994)
(arguing that the abolitionists understood the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to
require government protection from private violence).
200. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
201. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note
9, at 189–91 (describing these virtues).
202. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 141, art. 1–2.
203. See United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (describing how
Judge Nixon, who was later impeached for perjury arising out of the investigation of bribery
charges, had “been dissatisfied with his modest judicial salary, and had looked for means of
augmenting it”).
204. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 123, art. 1–2.
205. See generally J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971) (describing the challenges faced by federal
judges enforcing desegregation in the South).
206. Aristotle used the term eudaimonia to describe the end goal of human action. This
term was traditionally translated as “happiness.” See ARISTOTLE, supra note 187, at 1095a.
Saint Thomas used the term beatitudo, which likewise was translated as “happiness.” See
ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 1, art. 7 (“[A]ll men agree in desiring the last end,
which is happiness.”).
207. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 29 (stating that the virtues enable their possessor
to achieve “eudaimonia, to flourish or live well”).
208. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 187, at 1098a; see also ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II,
Q. 3, art. 5 (following Aristotle’s position).
209. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 1, art. 1; see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 11–51 (1999)
(reviewing the extent to which nonhuman animals possess characteristically human
capacities such as reason).
210. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 3, art. 5.
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his intellectual faculties is acting virtuously.211
Therefore, human
flourishing is partially constituted by virtue.
Virtue also equips humans to achieve human flourishing.212 The virtues
are those habits of character that perfect the portion of their possessor to
which they obtain.213 For example, a human does not flourish if he is not
temperate. A person who characteristically eats excessively has the vice of
intemperance.214 That person has difficulty controlling his pursuit of
physical goods, like food and drink.215 The desire for food controls the
person so that the person acts, not in accord with his practical reason, but
instead by dictate of his passion. This person, because of his lack of virtue,
is prevented from flourishing. To flourish, the intemperate person must
acquire the means to do so—a temperate disposition.
Virtue ethics is distinct from, but related to, natural law. Saint Thomas
Aquinas described the relationship between virtue and natural law as two
complementary mechanisms that direct humans toward human
flourishing.216 Virtues are internal guides to flourishing, while natural law
provides external guidance.217
Natural law is the body of norms that identifies which actions are, and
which are not, conducive to human flourishing.218 Natural law norms are
natural because they are tied to human nature: they identify which actions
are right and wrong by reference to a being with human characteristics.219
Natural law precepts are tied to human nature via the goods that natural law
norms direct humans to instantiate.220 Primary among the characteristics of

211. Id. at I–II, Q. 3, art. 2.
212. See id. at I–II, Q. 49, introduction (describing virtue as an “intrinsic principle” of
human action); Id. at I–II, Q. 55, art. 1 (describing virtue as the “perfection of a power,”
which in humans is rational).
213. See id. at I–II, Q. 55, art. 1 (describing virtue as the “perfection of a power”).
214. See id. at II–II, Q. 148, art. 1 (describing gluttony as the “inordinate desire” for
“eating and drinking”).
215. Id.
216. See CESSARIO, supra note 140, at 94–95 (describing the relationship between virtue
and natural law). For an extended discussion of the relationship between natural law and
virtue in St. Thomas’s thought, see Thomas Stewart Hibbs, The Pedagogy of Law and Virtue
in the Summa Theologiae (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Notre Dame University)
(on file with the Fordham Law Review); Michel Therrien, Law, Liberty & Virtue: A
Thomistic Defense for the Pedagogical Character of Law (2007) (unpublished Th.D.
dissertation, University of Fribourg) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
217. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 49, introduction (describing virtue as the
“intrinsic principle” of human action while natural law is the “extrinsic principle[]”).
218. See id. at I–II, Q. 90, art. 2 (“[T]he law must needs regard principally the
relationship to happiness.”).
219. See id. at I–II, Q. 91, art. 2 (describing natural law as “the rational creature’s
participation of the eternal law”); id. at I–II, Q. 94, art. 4 (“[T]he natural law belongs [to]
those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be
inclined to act according to reason.”); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 34 (“The basic
forms of good grasped by practical understanding are what is good for human beings with
the nature they have.”).
220. The New Natural Law scholars, including, most prominently, Germain Grisez and
John Finnis, have focused their arguments on describing the basic human goods that form
the foundation for their conception of natural law. See 1 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE
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humans is both a rational and animal nature.221 For instance, the first
principles of practical reason identified by St. Thomas include the
directions to act practically reasonably, and to preserve oneself.222
The virtues work hand-in-hand with natural law directives to facilitate
pursuit of human flourishing. Most important, the virtue of practical
wisdom imparts the capacity to correctly identify the principles of natural
law via identification of the goods towards which natural law directs human
actions.223 Practical wisdom also facilitates the choice of the best means to
secure a basic human good.224
The moral virtues ensure that one’s appetites for goods are properly
ordered by one’s reason.225 This ensures that one’s vision of what the
natural law requires is not blurred, and that one’s passions do not overawe
one’s (correct) judgment about what the natural law requires one to do.226
In sum, both virtue and natural law are tools that facilitate one’s pursuit of
happiness.
This Article explains how originalism and the judicial virtues have an
analogous relationship to natural law and virtue. The Constitution’s
original meaning plays a role parallel to natural law because it contains the
external positive227 norms that direct judges toward our society’s common
good. The judicial virtues, like virtue more generally, are the internal habits
of character that enable judges to know and faithfully apply the original
meaning. Both the original meaning and judicial virtues aim to secure the
common good of society; both natural law and virtue aim toward human
flourishing.
3. Return to Virtue Ethics
The modern growth of interest in virtue ethics paralleled (and partially
coincided with) that of natural law which, as I mentioned above,
experienced a revival beginning with John Finnis’s celebrated Natural Law
LORD JESUS: CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES, ch. 5, Q. D, art. 11 (describing seven categories
of basic human goods); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 59–126 (same).
221. Hence, virtues are divided into intellectual virtues and moral virtues.
222. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 94, art. 2.
223. See id. at I–II, Q. 94, art. 1 (“Synderesis [practical wisdom] . . . is a habit containing
the precepts of the natural law . . . .”); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 34 (“[B]y a simple
act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the object of the inclination which one
experiences is an instance of a general form of good . . . .”).
224. See FINNIS, supra note 139, at 88 (describing this facet of practical reason).
225. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 94, art. 4 (describing how one’s ability to
know and abide by the natural law may be challenged “both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge”); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 88 (describing how practical reason can
help “to bring one’s emotions and dispositions into the harmony of an inner peace of mind”).
226. The most famous instance of a person’s disordered appetite preventing that person
from pursuing a known principle of natural law was St. Augustine’s theft of pears. See ST.
AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS, bk. II, chs. 4–8 (R.S. Pine-Coffin trans., 1961). In this, St.
Augustine recounts how, as a youth, he stole pears from a neighbor’s tree despite the fact
that he was not hungry and that his parents’ pear tree produced better fruit. Id. St. Augustine
used this episode to exemplify the power of a disordered will—one not tamed by the moral
virtues—and how it could push one to perform an act that one knows is wicked. See id.
227. Here, I utilize the understanding of natural law as posited by God.
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and Natural Rights.228 Starting with a seminal article by Elizabeth
Anscombe in 1958, Modern Moral Philosophy,229 virtue ethics experienced
its modern revival.230 Since 1958—first as a trickle, and now as a strong
current—virtue ethics has established a significant scholarly presence.231
Virtue ethics has grown dramatically in the last forty years to become a
respected participant in moral philosophy.232
Today, though the most prominent proponents of virtue ethics have their
home in the Aristotelian tradition, they are divided in their relationship (or
lack thereof) to what is variously called the Thomistic or Natural Law
tradition.233 Some prominent scholars in the virtue ethics field are
relatively distinct from the Thomistic tradition.234 This group of NeoAristotelians most prominently includes Philippa Foot235 and Rosalind
Hursthouse.236 The other distinct set of scholars works within the
Thomistic tradition.237
These various schools of virtue ethics have much in common. In
particular, and for purposes of this Article, they overlap significantly in
their understanding of what counts as a virtue and the primary virtues.238

228.
229.
230.
231.

FINNIS, supra note 139.
Anscombe, supra note 19, at 1; see also FARRELLY & SOLUM, supra note 3, at 3–4.
See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 1–4.
For a selection of recent and more prominent works, see JULIA ANNAS, THE
MORALITY OF HAPPINESS (1993); CESARRIO, supra note 140; FARRELLY & SOLUM, supra
note 3; PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS (2001); PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND
OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1978); HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE? (Roger Crisp ed.,
1996); HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1; MACINTYRE, supra note 129; SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P.,
THE SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS (Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P., trans., 1995); MICHAEL
SLOTE, FROM MORALITY TO VIRTUE (1992); and CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE ETHICS: A
PLURALISTIC VIEW (2003).
232. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that virtue ethics “has acquired full
status, recognized as a rival to deontological and utilitarian approaches”).
233. For a history of Thomism, see ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P., A SHORT HISTORY OF
THOMISM (2005). For a history of early to mid-twentieth century Neo-Thomism, see
MCCOOL, supra note 134, and MCCOOL, supra note 135.
234. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 3 (“The modern philosophers whom we think of
as having put virtue ethics on the map . . . had all absorbed Plato and Aristotle, and in some
cases also Aquinas.”) (emphasis added).
235. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 3; see also FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS, supra note
231, at 53, 72 (repeatedly citing Aristotle, but referencing St. Thomas three times). Though
Foot passed away in late 2010, her work continues to have significant influence.
236. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 8 (“The particular version of virtue ethics I detail
and discuss . . . is of a more general kind known as ‘neo-Aristotelian.’”).
237. See, e.g., CESSARIO, supra note 140, at xvii (stating that his work is deeply indebted
to St. Thomas’s work); WILLIAM E. MAY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEOLOGY (2d ed.
2003) (relying heavily on St. Thomas).
238. The most important distinction between them is that the Neo-Aristotelian virtue
theorists focus on virtue ethics derived from human nature understood in contemporary
biological terms, while the Thomists frequently present arguments grounded in a
metaphysical teleology. Alasdair MacIntyre straddles both schools, especially in his
Dependent Rational Animals, where MacIntyre changes the course of his scholarship and
embraces the proposition that virtues are based on the “form of life . . . possible for beings
who are biologically constituted as we are.” MACINTYRE, supra note 209, at x; see also id. at
xi (describing his deep debt to St. Thomas’s thought).
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D. Virtue Ethics’ Limited Impact on Legal Scholarship
Despite flourishing in philosophical discourse, virtue ethics has only
barely begun to penetrate legal scholarship. Professor Lawrence Solum has
most prominently brought virtue ethics’ lessons to bear on legal issues.
Solum has written a series of articles, and co-edited a book, focusing on the
intersection of law and virtue ethics.239 A handful of scholars in specific
fields of law have similarly begun applying virtue ethics’ insights to
particular areas of law.240
There is, as of yet, no work describing the role that virtue may and
should play in originalism. This Article partially fills that gap by
explaining the multifarious ways in which virtue is essential to a fully
developed theory of originalism.
III. ORIGINALISM IS BETTER BECAUSE IT HAS A HOME FOR VIRTUE
In this Part, I locate the important points in the process of originalist
constitutional interpretation where virtue can and should play a role. What
I describe is a human practice that requires participants with particular
qualities if the practice is to flourish.
I begin by noting the common perception that originalism and virtue
ethics are incompatible. In response, I argue that originalism can
incorporate virtue ethics’ insights. Then, and most importantly, I show that
originalism should incorporate virtue ethics’ insights because doing so will
make originalism more descriptively accurate and normatively attractive.
A. Originalism Is Not Immune to Virtue
Originalism can learn from virtue ethics. There is nothing inherent in
originalism—its core claims, its foundational premises, or its practical
implementation—that precludes it from incorporating virtue ethics’
insights. For example, originalism’s core claims are described by the
fixation and contribution theses.241 The fixation thesis is that the
239. See supra note 9 (listing Professor Solum’s works on virtue ethics and law). Most
important for purposes of this Article, Solum published an article titled Virtue
Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, where he articulated a virtue-focused
theory of judging. See supra note 9.
240. See, e.g., Chapin F. Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 OR. L. REV. 703 (2009)
(contract law); R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian
Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147 (2002) (criminal law); Heidi Li Feldman,
Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1431 (2000) (tort law); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good
Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996) (legal ethics); Kyron Huigens, Virtue
and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (1995) (criminal law); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land
Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009) (property law); H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional
Virtues, 9 GREEN BAG 379 (2006) (constitutional law); Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue’s Domain,
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167 (criminal law); see also Horwitz, supra note 67, at 144–66
(applying virtue ethics to judging generally).
241. For the most thorough discussion of these theses in print, see Solum, supra note 122,
at 944, 954. See also Solum, supra note 55, at 29–32 (describing the theses); Randy E.
Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011)
(providing a slightly different statement of originalism’s core propositions).
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Constitution’s meaning was fixed when it was ratified.242 This is the
Constitution’s original meaning. The contribution thesis is that the
Constitution’s original meaning contributes to the content of constitutional
law.243
Virtue ethics’ claims have little, if anything, to say regarding these theses
because they address different subjects. Virtue ethics addresses human
character and acts, while the fixation and contribution theses address the
criteria for the truth of claims regarding constitutional meaning (within
originalism). For example, fortitude, in the context of judging, bears on
whether or not a judge has the courage to articulate the Constitution’s
original meaning, not whether or to what extent the Constitution’s meaning
was fixed at the point of ratification.244
Similarly, originalism’s foundational premises are consistent with virtue
ethics. For instance, originalism is premised on the proposition that the
Constitution’s original meaning is recoverable.245 Virtue ethics has nothing
to say directly to this originalist premise. Instead, virtue ethics can accept
the premise and help describe how an interpreter can fulfill that premise.
Lastly, originalism’s practical implementation via constitutional
precedent,246 among other mechanisms,247 also poses no tension with virtue
ethics. Indeed, the implementation of the Constitution’s original meaning
emphasizes that originalism is built on human practices, thereby giving
originalism a porosity that enables it to absorb virtue ethics’ concepts.
Originalism’s consistency with virtue ethics is true for those versions of
originalism that do not ground themselves in the Aristotelian philosophical
tradition, as well as those that do. For example, Professor Randy Barnett
has argued that originalism is the correct interpretative methodology
because it leads to a government that gives adequate assurances of natural
rights protection.248 Barnett’s normative justification for originalism
sounds in the deontological philosophical tradition.249 That tradition does
not exclude the insights of virtue ethics, and the numerous writers in that
tradition that have explicitly incorporated virtue ethics evidence this.250
242. See Solum, supra note 122, at 944, 954.
243. See id. Constitutional law is the label for the rules of law and legal doctrines
articulated in Supreme Court constitutional precedent.
244. The virtue of justice-as-lawfulness, which requires a judge to abide by the laws of
the judge’s society, does not conflict with the fixation and contribution theses because the
virtue does not identify what the law is to which the judge owes allegiance, while that
identifying function is the theses’ purpose.
245. Of course, originalists have defended this premise. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 113–14;
WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 162–63.
246. See Strang, supra note 111, at 1729.
247. Other mechanisms include long-standing practices and institutions like stare decisis
and the presidential cabinet.
248. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
supra note 7, at 45–47.
249. See id. at 14–15, 301–08 (distinguishing between natural law and natural rights).
250. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 3 (describing the increased utilization of virtue
ethics’ insights by utilitarians and deontologists); Onora O’Neill, Kant’s Virtues, in HOW
SHOULD ONE LIVE?, supra note 231, at 77 (providing an attempted reconciliation).
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Originalists who are working outside of the Aristotelian tradition can
incorporate the concept of virtue because every conception of originalism
recognizes that humans play important roles in the practice of constitutional
interpretation. The most central such actor is the judge. Judges and other
participants in our interpretative practice can perform their roles well or
poorly. Virtue helps explain how and why that is the case. It describes
(part of) what makes, for instance, a good judge good, and a bad citizen
bad.
Of course, versions of originalism, such as mine, that are explicitly
grounded on the tenets of the Aristotelian tradition, provide a ready-made
home for virtue ethics. In my previous writings, I argued that originalism is
the correct interpretative methodology because it best enables members of
our society to pursue human flourishing.251 My argument relied on the
Aristotelian tradition’s core concept of human flourishing.252 This Article
adds a second strand tying originalism to the Aristotelian tradition by
showing that virtue, which facilitates human flourishing, also facilitates
originalism.
A common reason for the perceived incompatibility of originalism and
virtue ethics is that originalism is purportedly a theory of rules, while virtue
ethics eschews rules in favor of elastic concepts like character and virtue.
Both of these perceptions reflect reality to some degree, but the conclusion
that originalism is incompatible with virtue ethics does not.
The perception that originalism is primarily a methodology of rules likely
gained currency from Justice Scalia, one of the earliest prominent
originalists.253 In his judicial254 and scholarly writings,255 Justice Scalia
argued that originalism will regularly lead to rules as the operative legal
norms. The best example of this is his article, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules.256 There, Justice Scalia argued that an originalism of rules will
better advance the Rule of Law by, for instance, limiting judicial
discretion.257 Nonoriginalists have focused on this claim in their criticism
of originalism,258 and originalists too have criticized the tendency to equate

251. See Strang, supra note 22, at 982–1000.
252. See id. I also previously identified situations where judges must use the judicial
virtues to effectively perform their judicial duties. For example, when federal judges must
decide whether to overrule a nonoriginalist precedent, I argued that they must utilize the
virtues of justice-as-lawfulness and practical wisdom. Strang, supra note 14, at 484–86.
Judges must employ those virtues because their decision requires them to apply three factors,
id. at 472, a process that is not significantly law-bounded and places great demands on the
judges’ judgment.
253. Justice Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986 provided an early and
prominent platform for his advocacy of originalism that he utilized in both his opinions and
scholarly writings.
254. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
255. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 1185.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 325, 341 (2009); Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 159, 170–73 (2009).
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originalism with legal rules.259 On the other hand, a frequent criticism
lodged against virtue ethics is that its purported lack of normative rules
disables it from offering sufficient ethical guidance.260
Both of these perceptions, though rooted in reality, are not wholly
accurate. Originalists have moved away from Justice Scalia’s claim that
originalism primarily produces legal rules (if originalists ever embraced the
proposition, which is not clear to me).261 Instead, as Professor Keith
Whittington has argued, the level of generality of operative legal norms is
determined by the Constitution’s original meaning itself.262 On occasion,
that meaning will be rule-like, while on other occasions, it will be
abstract.263 Likewise, virtue theorists, while acknowledging the fuzziness
of some of virtue ethics’ concepts, have argued that virtue ethics also
prescribes rules of conduct. For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse has
described the numerous “V-rules” that virtue ethics entails.264
Consequently, both originalism and virtue ethics produce (legal and
ethical) rules and more abstract norms. This conclusion, coupled with
originalism’s new porosity to virtue ethics, discussed above,265 sets the
stage for my argument below, that originalism should incorporate virtue
ethics.
B. Virtue’s Home in Originalism
In this section, I show some of the many ways in which concepts from
virtue ethics contribute to a richer originalism. First, I show that an
originalism that takes on virtue ethics’ insights is more descriptively
accurate. Second, I describe the virtues’ roles at key steps in the
interpretative process and show how virtue ethics makes originalism more
normatively attractive. I end by summarizing virtue ethics’ contribution to
originalism: it preserves originalism’s core insights, while facilitating its
transformation.
1. Greater Explanatory Power
Originalism’s incorporation of virtue ethics will make originalism more
descriptively accurate in at least four ways: (1) originalism will be more
259. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted”
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 11 (2006) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s “ruleification” of
originalism).
260. See, e.g., HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 35–42 (identifying and responding to this
view).
261. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for Sixth Amendment
Originalism, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 45–46 (2011) (arguing that, consistently
applied, originalism would, in some significant number of cases, “lead[] away from brightline rules”).
262. See Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin’s “Originalism”: The Role of Intentions in
Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 214 (2000).
263. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 184–87.
264. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 28–42.
265. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing a transformed originalism that, among other
characteristics, acknowledges judicial discretion).
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hospitable to and paint in a better light common practices; (2) originalism
will be able to embrace the widespread and attractive conception of judging
as a craft; (3) originalism will be able to emphasize the fact that
constitutional interpretation is a human practice; and (4) originalism will
better fit the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ plan of constitutional government
which embraced their virtue-infused assumptions.
Fit is a powerful argument in law.266 The more “data” of a legal practice
that a purported “interpretation” of that practice can satisfactorily explain,
the more powerful the theory. A proffered interpretation of a legal practice
that accounts for only twenty percent of the practice’s data does not fit and,
therefore, cannot be an interpretation of that practice. However, the
quantity of data fit by an interpretation is only one axis upon which to
evaluate interpretations. Interpretations also vary on the axis of the quality
of their fit. For instance, some interpretations are more elegant than others;
they may fit the data more cleanly. The result is that one should prefer an
interpretation that paints a practice in a better light even if that
interpretation fits slightly less of the data than a competing interpretation.
Currently, originalism is in tension with major facets of American
constitutional interpretative practice. Most prominently, critics have argued
that originalism cannot account for the role nonoriginalist precedent plays
in constitutional adjudication.267 Constitutional adjudication undeniably
continues to employ nonoriginalist precedent. This limits originalism’s
claim to adequately describe our practice of constitutional interpretation.
Virtue ethics helps originalism incorporate the practice of nonoriginalist
precedent.268 It does so by ensuring that judges who face nonoriginalist
precedent will still regard themselves as bound by the Constitution’s
original meaning, and therefore nonoriginalist precedent will not erode the
original meaning’s pride-of-place. A judge with the virtue of justice-aslawfulness will seek to give the Constitution’s original meaning its full due.
Therefore, a virtuous judge will refrain from overruling or limiting a
nonoriginalist precedent only for good reasons.269 Accepting the continued
viability of some nonoriginalist precedent will not, therefore, undermine
originalism, and originalism can more easily fit this facet of our legal
practice.
More important, originalism’s picture of practices, such as nonoriginalist
precedent, will also be more attractive because it will have the tools to
explain how to make judges engaging in the practices the best they can be.
Judges’ decisions on whether and to what extent to overrule or limit a
nonoriginalist precedent will frequently be hard. Judges have to evaluate
and weigh a number of factors, each of which has a hard-to-quantify
266. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 230 (1986).
267. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 15–17 (2001).
268. Although I focus my arguments on the practice of nonoriginalist precedent, my
analysis applies as well to constitutional construction, originalist precedent, and the
articulation and application of the original meaning.
269. See Strang, supra note 14, at 472 (describing the criteria a judge should consider, to
refrain from overruling nonoriginalist precedent).
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weight. An originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics can
show how judges faced with those difficult choices can make the best
determinations, all things considered. For example, a judge with practical
wisdom will, by definition, have the best insight into the extent to which
overruling a nonoriginalist precedent would harm Rule of Law values.
Relatedly, an originalism that incorporates concepts from virtue ethics
will produce the judges most capable of accurately evaluating nonoriginalist
precedent because originalism will have the tools to identify and/or educate
judges best suited to the practice. For example, originalism will have the
resources to suggest that potential judges “acquire judicial intelligence,
integrity, and wisdom” from “train[ing] in the law [and] experience [in]
legal practice.”270 With its ability to identify, inculcate, and select for
virtuous judges, originalism will produce better results.
Second, once originalism has incorporated virtue ethics’ insights, it will
also fit the widespread judging-as-craft account of judging.271 The core
insight of this account is that judges are participants in a human practice
with internal standards,272 and that, to be excellent in the craft, a judge must
master those standards. Hence, some judges, more than others, are
excellent writers, construct elegant analyses of the law, powerfully
articulate the law’s meaning and import, possess a judicial disposition, and
so on.
Virtue ethics helps originalism incorporate this judging-as-craft account
of judging. Originalism can emphasize, for instance, the theoretical
wisdom a judge needs in order to fashion a persuasive presentation of the
Constitution’s original meaning.
Third, giving virtue a place in originalism emphasizes, in a way that is
often missed, the key fact that constitutional interpretation is a human
practice.273 Virtue helps originalism explain that law is a process, with
human actors at each critical step in the process. Law begins when an
authorized person or group of people identifies a problem they believe is
susceptible to legal solution. These legislators craft a law, the goal of
which is to re-order society to solve identified problems. The executive
branch enforces the law. In some instances, enforcement requires judicial
resolution on whether, to what extent, and how the law applies to discrete
parties. Lastly, citizens governed by the law internalize the law and act
according to its dictates.

270. Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to
Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1755 (1988).
271. Some of the more prominent judging-as-craft scholarship includes BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A
JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH (1980); KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); and THE ART AND CRAFT OF
JUDGING: THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND (Herschel Shanks ed., 1968).
272. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 129, at 187–91 (describing his earlier conception of
virtues internal to human practices).
273. See Horwitz, supra note 67, at 106–07 (describing a return to the humancenteredness of legal practice).
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At each step in the process of law, human actors will perform their roles
more or less well depending upon whether they possess the requisite
virtues. The virtues I described above are key to describing and evaluating
the performance of these human participants. Below, I describe in detail the
virtues required for judges to articulate the Constitution’s original meaning
and apply that meaning in cases.
Fourth, originalism, bolstered by virtue ethics, better fits the historical
record surrounding the Framing and Ratification and therefore the
Constitution itself. The Framers and Ratifiers believed in virtue ethics and
relied on that belief when constructing the Constitution.274 Historical and
legal scholarship, though differing on the degree to which virtue ethics was
part of the intellectual climate during the Framing and Ratification,
generally agrees with my modest claim that, among other intellectual
commitments, the Framers and Ratifiers believed in virtue ethics and relied
on that belief when constructing the Constitution.275
Perhaps the clearest instance of this is James Madison’s observation, in
Federalist 57, that
[t]he aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain
for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to
pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue
to hold their public trust.276

This conception of representation, which was a premise of the
Constitution’s structure of representation,277 incorporated virtue ethics.278
Originalism, once it has embraced virtue ethics, has a greater ability to
appreciate this historical fact. Originalism can, for instance, acknowledge

274. The literature on the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ intellectual commitments is vast and
conflicted. See generally Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J.
AM. HIST. 11 (1992) (describing the intellectual history of scholarly views on the Framing
and Ratification period). The foundational sources for the proposition that a commitment to
virtue ethics was at least one dominant current during the Framing and Ratification are
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A.
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); and GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787 (1969). These sources generated a “Republican
Revival” in legal scholarship in the mid-1980s to early 1990s. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman,
Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
275. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 274, at 38–45 (describing the role of virtue in the
Federalists’ conception of representation and structures of representation).
276. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 316 (James Madison) (George Stade, ed. 2006).
277. For instance, the President is elected by electors. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 276, at 375, (John Jay) (“As the select assemblies
for choosing the President . . . will, in general, be composed of the most enlightened and
respectable citizens, there is reason to presume, that their attention and their votes will be
directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and
virtue.”).
278. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 276, at 288 (James Madison) (“If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”).
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and utilize the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ virtue-based concepts and
assumptions when articulating the Constitution’s original meaning.279
2. Virtue’s Home in Originalism
For each of the following facets of originalist constitutional
interpretation, I describe how virtue ethics provides the tools originalism
needs to make originalism the best it can be. The virtues’ roles fall into two
categories: first, where judges exercise discretion; and second, where
ascertaining and applying the Constitution’s determinate original meaning
places significant burdens on judges’ faculties. The first category occurs
primarily in the contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional
construction, while the second takes place in the contexts of originalist
precedent and articulating and applying the original meaning.
The key contribution virtue ethics makes in each instance is that the
virtues enable judges to give the original meaning its due, while also giving
other interpretative factors their due, all in their proper proportion. Virtue
ethics facilitates originalism’s transformation because the virtues preserve
originalism as a viable interpretative methodology by preventing the
transformative admission of judicial discretion from cannibalizing the rest
of the theory. I explain this further at the end of this Article.
a. Virtue’s Role when Judges Exercise Discretion:
Nonoriginalist Precedent and Constitutional Construction
In this section, I describe the various ways the judicial virtues operate
when judges possess discretion. The two main instances of this are the
contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional construction.
Nonoriginalist precedent is precedent that incorrectly articulated and/or
applied the Constitution’s original meaning.280 Large swaths of American
constitutional law are populated or, in some cases, dominated by
nonoriginalist precedent.281 Nonoriginalists have argued that originalism is
fatally flawed by this fact because: either originalism will eliminate all
nonoriginalist precedent, in which case originalism will be too destabilizing
to Rule of Law values; or, originalism will overrule some but not all

279. A possible example of this is the issue of nonoriginalist precedent. If the Framers
and Ratifiers employed the concept of virtue when drafting and ratifying “judicial Power,”
then the original meaning of “judicial Power” is more likely to include a place for
nonoriginalist precedent, than if they did not assume judges would utilize the judicial virtues.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 276, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing how
Article III tenure protection was necessary to induce excellent lawyers to become federal
judges because of the “very considerable bulk” of precedent such judges would have to
master).
280. In a recent article, I described in detail the standard of “originalism in good faith” to
distinguish originalist from nonoriginalist precedent. Strang, supra note 111, at 1739–52.
281. See Strang, supra note 14, at 430–31.
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nonoriginalist precedent, which will then give judges tremendous discretion
and similarly undermine Rule of Law values.282
Some originalists, including myself, have argued that federal judges are
constitutionally required by Article III to give constitutional precedent,
including nonoriginalist precedent, significant respect.283 In particular, a
judge must utilize three factors to decide whether to overrule a
nonoriginalist precedent: (1) the extent of the precedent’s deviation from
the Constitution’s original meaning; (2) the harm to Rule of Law values
caused by overruling the precedent; and (3) the extent to which the
precedent creates a just social ordering.284 However, this opens originalism
to the second nonoriginalist criticism: that originalism gives judges too
much discretion. Virtue ethics enables originalism to adequately address
this critique.
Originalists can argue that a judge with the judicial virtues will
appropriately evaluate the three factors and come to the correct
conclusion—the conclusion that gives the Constitution’s original meaning
its due regard while, at the same time, taking into account other important
values, such as stability. First, the virtuous judge will possess the virtue of
theoretical wisdom, which will enable the judge to accurately ascertain the
Constitution’s original meaning. For instance, when faced with a case that
requires a judge to ascertain the Commerce Clause’s meaning, this virtue
will permit the judge to perform the necessary research into the historical
data.285 The judge will also review pertinent originalist precedent.286
Then, the judge will synthesize those legal materials into the authoritative
constitutional meaning. At the same time, the judge will ascertain the
meaning of the nonoriginalist precedent in question.287
Second, a judge with the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has the
disposition to give the Constitution’s original meaning, and binding
originalist precedent, its due regard: to treat it as controlling. This means,
among other things, that the virtuous judge will be inclined to overrule
nonoriginalist precedent, especially precedent that deviates greatly from the
Constitution’s original meaning.
For example, Wickard v. Filburn
pronounced what has become known as the substantial effects test.288
Wickard is a nonoriginalist precedent because it incorrectly articulated the

282. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking
and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 132 (1991).
283. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 102, at 806; Strang, supra note 14, at 420.
Even originalists, like Professor Barnett, who advocate overruling all nonoriginalist
precedent, seem to hedge on this point. See Barnett, supra note 110, at 266 (“[I]n my view, a
commitment to original meaning over precedent does not entail a commitment to rejecting
properly tailored reliance claims by individual citizens.”).
284. See Strang, supra note 14, at 472.
285. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY,
supra note 7, at 274–318 (engaging in this inquiry).
286. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1408–22 (1987) (evaluating pre-New Deal Commerce Clause case law).
287. See id. at 1443–54.
288. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
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Commerce Clause’s original meaning.289 Coming to this conclusion will
incline the virtuous judge to overrule Wickard.
Third, the virtuous judge will utilize the virtue of practical wisdom to
ascertain the extent of harm to Rule of Law values (if any) that the judge
would cause if he overruled a precedent. This will frequently be a difficult
task. For instance, in evaluating whether to overrule (or limit) Wickard, the
judge faces the daunting challenge of calculating the reliance interests built
on Wickard; for instance, in the form of numerous federal statutes premised
on the substantial effects test.290
Additionally, practical wisdom empowers a judge to articulate legal
doctrine that will accurately connect the Constitution’s meaning to the facts
presented by a case. In the context of nonoriginalist precedent, this will
frequently be a challenging task if the judge determines not to overrule the
precedent but, instead, to limit it. The judge will then have to modify
existing (nonoriginalist) doctrine in a way that moves constitutional law
toward the original meaning, while at the same time ensuring that the
doctrine is as coherent as possible. The challenge to doctrinal coherence is
caused by the dichotomous commitments made by the hypothetical
doctrine: on the one hand, the nonoriginalist precedent remains viable,
pulling the doctrine in one direction; and on the other hand, the original
meaning pulls the doctrine in another direction. Practical wisdom gives a
judge the ability to make the best of this difficult—though very common—
situation.
This was arguably the situation faced by the Justices inclined to limit
Wickard in United States v. Lopez.291 Wickard’s substantial effects test, the
majority acknowledged, could justify upholding the challenged law.292 To
preserve—and limit—Wickard, while at the same time moving the Court’s
Commerce Clause case law toward the original meaning, the majority
articulated the commercial/noncommercial distinction as an added limit to
Wickard’s reach.293
Fourth, in evaluating whether the nonoriginalist precedent in question
creates a just ordering, a judge must utilize the virtue of justice-asfairness.294 While the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness inclines the judge

289. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY,
supra note 7, at 315 (criticizing Wickard’s departure from the original meaning).
290. See Strang, supra note 14, at 445–46.
291. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
292. See id. at 563–68.
293. See id.
294. In addition to justice-as-lawfulness, described in the text, Aristotle also described a
narrower manifestation of justice: justice as equality, or justice-as-fairness. See ARISTOTLE,
supra note 187, at 1129b. Justice-as-fairness is giving each individual his due without
giving the pertinent legal norm dispositive weight. Scholars often employ the label
“general” justice for justice-as-lawfulness, and “particular” justice for justice-as-equality.
See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 143, AT 130 n.e (“‘General’ is the more convenient qualifier
because Aquinas, following Aristotle, divides justice into ‘general’ (‘legal’) and ‘particular’
(or ‘special’).”); KRAUT, supra note 187, at 102 n.6 (“Many scholars call justice as
lawfulness ‘universal’ or ‘general’ justice, and justice as equality ‘particular’ or ‘special’
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toward overruling the nonoriginalist precedent—because of its illegality—
the virtue of justice-as-fairness enables the judge to determine whether the
precedent otherwise—that is, despite its inconsistency with the original
meaning—properly orders relations.
Again, taking a constitutional challenge to Wickard as our example, the
virtuous judge will decide whether the increased scope to Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority increases or decreases just relationships. One
place where this inquiry has bite is the federal antidiscrimination laws that
are premised on Wickard’s expansive reading of the Commerce Clause.
Would overruling Wickard cause the demise of the Civil Rights Act, which
helped eliminate one form of unjust ordering?295
Each of the decisions made by a judge in the process of evaluating the
continued vitality of a nonoriginalist precedent is augmented by a virtue.
Having these virtues, by hypothesis, makes it more likely that these
decisions are the best they can be. Therefore, although a judge has
discretion, that discretion does not undermine the originalist project because
the Constitution’s original meaning is given pride-of-place, consistent with
other values.
Indeed, the virtuous judge’s discretion provides the
opportunity to arrive at the best (humanly possible) decision, all things
considered. The virtuous judge will not be the perfect judge, however, and
this is especially true when the burdens on the judge’s capacities are at their
highest; for instance, in determining harm to Rule of Law values.
Constitutional construction is another part of originalism that explicitly
acknowledges judicial discretion. As with nonoriginalist precedent,
originalism augmented by virtue ethics can incorporate the concept of
construction without undermining originalism. This is because a judge who
possesses the judicial virtues will, so far as possible, respect the
Constitution’s original meaning and, by hypothesis, construct the best
constitutional meaning within the original meaning’s parameters.
As I described above,296 constitutional construction occurs when the
Constitution’s meaning is underdetermined. That is, using his best efforts,
a judge is unable to conclude that the Constitution provides one right
answer to a legal question.297 In other words, the Constitution’s meaning
limits possible answers to a legal question, but it does not designate one
answer as uniquely correct. Judges, in the context of constitutional
justice.”); see also Strang, supra note 14, at 477–78 (describing this concept in greater
detail).
295. This determination, in turn, involves a significant number of subsidiary
determinations that require practical wisdom for their proper resolution: Are there other
plausible constitutional bases for the Act? Do state and local antidiscrimination laws
adequately ensure just relationships in the absence of federal law? Are popular mores such
that federal antidiscrimination laws are no longer necessary? Are federal antidiscrimination
laws themselves sufficiently harmful in their collateral consequences that their elimination
is, on balance, good?
296. See supra Part I.B.2.
297. In all situations of which I am aware, the Constitution has some meaning that bears
on the point and therefore provides some guidance, so the original meaning is
underdetermined and not indeterminate.
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construction are, therefore, left with a choice. Judges must choose one of
the answers that is consistent with, but not determined by, the Constitution.
As with nonoriginalist precedent, the judicial virtues of theoretical
wisdom and justice-as-lawfulness will enable the virtuous judge to correctly
decide what the original meaning is, allow the judge to recognize that the
original meaning does not determine the outcome of the case, and give the
judge the disposition to follow, so far as possible, that original meaning.
These virtues prevent the judge from seeing underdeterminacy when the
original meaning is determinate. This preserves the original meaning’s
primacy in constitutional interpretation.
Practical wisdom, unlike in the context of nonoriginalist precedent,
performs on a significantly more “open field” here. In the nonoriginalist
precedent context, the judge’s practical wisdom is limited to the task of
ascertaining whether and to what extent overruling would harm the Rule of
Law. That is frequently a difficult task, though it is focused. By contrast
here, within the known original meaning, the judge’s task is to play the
legislative role of constructing constitutional meaning that will best advance
the common good. All of the variables that a legislator would take into
account, the judge should also utilize.
By contrast, constitutional
interpretation, discussed below, does not place as significant a burden on
judges’ practical wisdom because the original meaning determines those
cases’ outcomes.
b. Virtue’s Place in Determinate Law: Constitutional Interpretation
and Originalist Precedent
In this section, I spell out how virtue ethics makes originalism a better
theory even in those many situations where, unlike above, judicial decisions
are constrained by the original meaning. The common theme here is that
there are hard cases that place significant burdens on judges’ faculties, and
that to bear those burdens well, judges need the judicial virtues.
The core process of constitutional interpretation includes both
articulating the Constitution’s meaning and applying that meaning in the
context of a case.298 Constitutional interpretation differs from construction
(and nonoriginalist precedent) because, unlike with construction, judges do
not have discretion. Consequently, the virtues’ roles are different, though
still significant.
Constitutional interpretation occurs when the Constitution’s determinate
meaning is explicated. In originalism, constitutional meaning is the
constitutional text’s publicly understood meaning when that text was
ratified. One identifies the Constitution’s original meaning by looking at
the text and structure of the Constitution in light of the historical, cultural,
religious, and philosophical contexts in which the text was adopted. This is
primarily an historical inquiry.
298. Compare Strang, supra note 111, at 1767–78, with Solum, supra note 101, at 95,
100–08 (describing these two stages in a different manner).
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A judge engaged in constitutional interpretation will need the intellectual
virtue of theoretical wisdom. The need for theoretical wisdom will vary
depending on, among other variables, how patent the text’s original
meaning is. In some situations, this is a difficult task. A possible example
of this is the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Although there are
extensive discussions of the Clause in the Reconstruction Congress, the
Clause’s original meaning is relatively difficult to reconstruct.299
As with other facets of originalism, judges will also need the moral virtue
of justice-as-lawfulness. This ensures that the judges follow the original
meaning.
A judge will utilize practical wisdom to bridge the distance between the
Constitution’s original meaning and the facts of a case. The larger the
distance, the greater the burden practical wisdom must carry. For instance,
in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court faced the challenge of
articulating constitutional doctrine that, faithful to the Commerce Clause’s
original meaning, specified300 how that meaning governed a changing
economy and society. In particular, the challenge included properly
mediating the Clause’s application to new or newly common phenomena.
The Court met this challenge by articulating a number of constitutional law
doctrines.
The original packages doctrine is one such doctrinal move. In a series of
cases, beginning in 1827 with Brown v. Maryland,301 the Supreme Court
fashioned the doctrine to mediate two constitutional commitments: (1)
Congress’s authority over interstate commerce; and (2) the states’ reserved
police power over in-state commercial transactions. The doctrine’s function
was to find a doctrinal line that accomplished this purpose and fit the facts
of the world.
For example, in Austin v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court decided whether
the doctrine applied to cigarettes imported from other states in relatively
small packages.302 To reach its conclusion, the Court reviewed the
doctrine’s seventy-year history, and how the doctrine advanced its purpose
of mediating between the constitutional commitments identified above.303
299. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 140–41 (1986) (“There was clearly
vagueness and some confusion in the minds of the framers about the actual language of the
amendment and its relationship to the original Constitution.”); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW,
ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS 56 (2006) (“The record is less clear [than the 1866 Civil Rights Act] with regard to
which substantive rights [were] encompassed in the broadly worded provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1397 (1992) (“Indeed, I hesitate to attribute to most participants
in the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment any precise notion of the
meaning of Section 1.”); Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection—A History of
Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 540 (1985) (finding that the historical “evidence . . . is
not entirely consistent” or is “simply ambiguous”).
300. See Strang, supra note 111, at 1767–78 (describing the process of specification).
301. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827).
302. See 179 U.S. 343, 350 (1900).
303. See id. at 351–63.
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In many of the original packages doctrine cases, the Court engaged in
similar line drawing. Practical wisdom facilitated this.
Originalist precedent is one—particularly important—facet of
constitutional interpretation, where judges do not have discretion. To
properly understand, synthesize, follow, and apply originalist precedent, a
judge will need theoretical wisdom, justice-as-lawfulness, and practical
wisdom.
Using the pre-New Deal Commerce Clause case law as an example, the
Supreme Court had crafted a number of interrelated doctrines that formed a
complex body of law. These included: the original packages doctrine,304
mentioned above, the instrumentalities of commerce doctrine,305 the
streams of commerce doctrine,306 the doctrinal distinction between
commerce and manufacturing,307 and the related doctrinal distinction
between direct and indirect effects.308 These doctrines represented the
Court’s attempt to follow the twin constitutional commitments to federal
commerce power and state police power.309 To master this intricate body
of law, a judge would have needed theoretical wisdom, and to have
followed it faithfully would have required justice-as-lawfulness.
3. Originalism Transformed into a Home for Virtue
Incorporating virtue ethics into originalism makes originalism’s
transformation possible. Originalists can embrace the discretion wielded by
judges as a result of originalism’s response to legal-realist-type criticism
because virtue ethics provides the tools to show that originalism’s core
insights remain intact. The Constitution’s original meaning retains its
privileged position because of justice-as-lawfulness, which inclines judges
to follow it, and theoretical wisdom helps judges accurately ascertain the
original meaning.
In those situations where judges wield discretion, practical wisdom, and
the moral virtues of temperance and fortitude, ensure that judges reach the
humanly best result within the scope of the judge’s discretion. When
judges do not have discretion, the virtues ensure that judges construct the
best legal doctrines.

304. See Brown, 25 U.S. at 441–42; supra note 183 and accompanying text.
305. See Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351–52 (1914); supra note 184 and
accompanying text.
306. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398–99 (1905); supra note 185 and
accompanying text; see also Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 515–16 (1922).
307. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
308. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–48 (1935).
309. See E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 13 (“It is vital that the independence of the
commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation between them, however
sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed, for while the one
furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation of the
autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of government.”).
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I explained the many ways in which concepts from virtue
ethics are, contrary to popular perception, compatible with an originalist
theory of constitutional interpretation. More important, I showed that
originalism is more normatively attractive and descriptively accurate when
it takes on board virtue ethics’ insights.
Originalism has transformed over the past thirty years in response to
legal-realist-type criticisms. Most importantly, originalism has come to
acknowledge judicial discretion in constitutional adjudication.
An
originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics, however, is able to
simultaneously preserve originalism as a viable theory of constitutional
interpretation while, at the same time, continuing to acknowledge judicial
discretion. Virtue ethics enables originalist judges to effectively interpret
and put into practice the Constitution’s original meaning despite and, in
part, because of this judicial discretion.
Similarly, incorporating virtue ethics will make originalism a stronger
interpretive method in those contexts where, even though the original
meaning provides a determinate answer, the case places significant burdens
on the judge’s judgment. In this class of cases—neither the easy cases nor
those that are underdeterminate—virtue ethics provides the means to
explain how judges can best decide.
An originalism that incorporates virtue ethics’ insights will give the
Constitution’s original meaning its due. At the same time, it also gives
other factors—such as the practical workability of legal doctrine—their due,
all in their proper proportion. For originalists, and for nonoriginalists who
value the Constitution’s original meaning, this preserves originalism’s core
insights and value, while enabling originalism’s transformation.

